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Plea bargaininghappens in almost every criminal case, yet there is little
empirical study about what actually happens when prosecutors and defense lawyers
negotiate. This Article looks into the bargainingpart of plea bargaining. It reports
on the responses of over 500 public defenders who participatedin our nationwide
survey about their objectives and practices duringplea negotiations.
The survey responses create a rareempiricaltest of a major tenet of negotiation
theory, the claim that attorneys bargain in the "shadow of the trial." This is a theory
that some defenders embrace and others reject. Describingthefactors they believe to
be importantin plea negotiations, some public defenders-those who emphasize the
importance of collateral consequences or the pre-trial custody of their clients-do
not stress the likely outcome at trial. Instead, these attorneysfocus on the wants and
needs of clients, hoping to persuade the prosecutor to operate outside a trialpredictionframework. These defense attorneys might ask the prosecutor to dismiss
charges, to divert the defendant out of the system, or to recommend a sentencefar
below the expected outcome. Such dispositions based on equitablefactors, many of
them related to the larger life circumstances of the defendant, point the prosecutor
toward an outcome that is independent of any likely trial result or post-trial
sentence. These defense attorneys, we argue, bargain in the "shadow of the client"
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rather than the shadow of the trial. Multivariate analysis of the survey answers
allows us to identify which attorney backgroundfactors correlate with each of the
distinct theories of negotiation.
After asking public defenders about their plea bargaining aspirations, our
survey turns to actual negotiation practices. Here, defenders' self-reported
bargainingmethods do not measure up to their declared aspirations. Their own
descriptions of the fact investigations and legal research they typically perform
ignore some viable outcomes that their clients might prefer. Particularly for
attorneys who aim to negotiate in the shadow of the client, there is a wide gap
between theory and practice.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Anybody who wants to understand or improve criminal justice in
the United States must learn how plea bargains work. And there is

plenty to learn about the outcomes of this process-the plea part of plea
bargaining. Empirical studies show differences in outcomes based on
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the crime charged, the race and gender of the defendant, and other
background conditions.'
On the other hand, it is much harder to learn what actually
happens during the negotiations between a prosecutor and defense
2
lawyer and what preparation occurs before the bargaining starts. In
short, we know relatively little-empirically speaking-about the
bargaining part of plea bargaining. This is unsurprising in some
respects, because negotiations happen behind closed doors or in rushed
hallway meetings; they involve conversations between people who lack
the time and incentive to record their strategies or interactions.
The field realities of the bargaining process deserve study, both in
doctrinal and theoretical terms. Consider first the importance of
negotiation behavior in terms of legal doctrine. Over the last decade, the
Supreme Court has shown belated interest in plea bargaining. For now,
the Court has lightly regulated the conversations about guilty pleas that
defense counsel and judges conduct with defendants.3 The Court has
yet to enter the thicket of actual bargaining-the conversations between
the defense counsel and the prosecutor. 4 That next step may arrive soon,
though, as lower courts encounter claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel during bargaining exchanges with prosecutors.5

1 See infra Section II.A. There is also ample legal commentary about the problems with these
negotiated outcomes and the best methods for regulating them. See, e.g., Darryl K. Brown,
JudicialPower to Regulate Plea Bargaining, 57 wM. & MARY L. REv. 1225 (2016).
2 The limited examples of empirical work on the bargaining process itself focus on the
interaction between lawyer and client, judicial participation, or the prosecutor's decision
calculus. See infra Part II.
3 See Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156 (2012); Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134 (2012); Padilla v.
Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010).
4 See Cynthia Alkon, What's Law Got to Do with It? Plea BargainingReform After Lafler and
Frye, 7 Y.B. ON ARB. & MEDIATION 1 (2015); Jenny Roberts, Effective Plea BargainingCounsel,
122 YALE L.J. 2650, 2653 (2013).
5 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Marinho, 981 N.E.2d 648, 657-58 (Mass. 2013) (relying on
state constitutional grounds but citing Padilla, Frye, and Lafler in holding that counsel violated
the first prong of the Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984), ineffective assistance of
counsel test when counsel failed to bargain for a disposition that would avoid deportation
consequences of a conviction); see Cynthia Alkon, Plea Bargain Negotiations: Defining
Competence Beyond Lafler and Frye, 53 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 377 (2016). Routine plea bargaining
practices influence prevailing professional norms that are expressly incorporated into the
definition of reasonably competent counsel under the Sixth Amendment. Padilla, 559 U.S. at
366-367. On the other hand, constitutional pronouncements from the Supreme Court can drive
defense practice on the ground; these effects occurred for capital mitigation trainings after the
Court decided Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003), and for immigration trainings in the wake
of Padilla. See Jenny Roberts, Too Little, Too Late: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, the Duty to
Investigate, and Pretrial Discovery in Criminal Cases, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1097, 1116 n.97
(2004) (noting the capital defense bar's "swift" reaction to Wiggins and citing mitigation
training).
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In short, legal doctrine about plea bargaining has brought us to the

gateway of a regulatory era. At such a moment, shouldn't we know-as
wise regulators-what actually takes place in the bargaining halls?

Consider second the theoretical insights that might result from
learning about the nuts and bolts of plea bargaining. The tenets of
negotiation theory, which developed in the contexts of labor contract
negotiations and civil litigation,6 have not seeped very deeply into the
ground of the criminal courts. 7 Criminal practitioners routinely say, "I
just don't think it's something that can be taught."8 A catalog of actual
bargaining practices among prosecutors and defense attorneys,
therefore, could show whether the positive theory of negotiationdeveloped in another litigation context-applies with equal force to
criminal adjudication. Scholars might also predict the impact if the
normative insights from negotiation theory (its framework of best
practices) were to become more common in criminal practice.
So we went out into the field and asked. We began our research
with semi-structured interviews with public defenders in four states,
asking them about their negotiation practices and the factors they
believed to be important during a plea negotiation. Based on what we
heard during those interviews, we developed a survey and received

responses from public defenders in every region of the country. 9
Through the survey results, attorneys told us what they typically

do to prepare for plea negotiations and described, step-by-step, their
ordinary interactions with prosecutors during the negotiation itself.1o
Even more important, public defenders opined about the practices and

background conditions that could make the biggest difference during
an idealized negotiation.
The survey answers therefore reveal latent theories of negotiation
that defense attorneys pursue, even if imperfectly. One of those implicit
theories is consistent with the traditional idea that litigators bargain in
6 See Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Pracademics: Making Negotiation Theory Implemented,
Interdisciplinary,and International, 1 INT'L J. CONFLICT ENGAGEMENT & RESOL. 188, 189 (2013).
7 But see Stephanos Bibas, Plea BargainingOutside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV.
2463 (2004).
8 Interview with Public Defender A (transcripts of the interviews we conducted for this study
are on file with the authors).
9 We received responses from 579 attorneys. We analyzed the partial responses to one of the
four parts of this survey in Jenny Roberts & Ronald F. Wright, Trainingfor Bargaining,57 WM.
& MARY L. REv. 1445 (2016). We focused this survey on defense attorneys to the exclusion of
prosecutors, and public defenders rather than private defense attorneys. The comparison of
responses among these different groups of attorneys merits future research but falls outside the
scope of this Article.
10 The inherent limits of self-reported survey data about the respondents' own behavior are
front and center for us as we interpret responses to these questions. For a discussion of the
limitations of our methods, see infra Part III.
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the "shadow of the trial."" According to this view, the most important
drivers of negotiation outcomes are the likely outcome at trial and the
probable sentence imposed after trial. Defense attorneys who negotiate
in the shadow of the trial picture specific procedural stages at trial and
at the sentencing hearing. According to this theory, they would
negotiate based on the likely effects of legally relevant features of the
defendant and the offense.
A second implicit theory of negotiation that emerges from the
survey is grounded in a bit of conventional wisdom: attorneys believe
that they should attach the highest importance to the client's "wants and
needs." At first blush, it is not surprising that attorneys claim to put a
high value on client wishes, as their ethical obligations require them to
do.12 What is striking about this claim is how some attorneys compare
this starting point principle to other possible influences on negotiation
outcomes. These attorneys rate their clients' wishes as more important
to the outcome of a negotiation than their own caseloads, more
important than the personalities and reputations of the negotiators, and
even more important than the predicted outcome at trial or at
sentencing.
According to this second theory of negotiation, defense attorneys
would persuade the prosecutor to evaluate their client's situation
outside of a trial-prediction framework. They might ask the prosecutor
to divert the defendant out of the system, to dismiss charges, or to
recommend a sentence far below the expected outcome for the current
charge. During these plea negotiations defense counsel could appeal to
equitable factors, many of them related to the larger life circumstances
of the defendant. These factors might point the prosecutor towards an
outcome that is the right thing to do, independent of any likely trial
result or post-trial sentence.
Thus, the defense attorneys who responded to our survey
disagreed about the type of shadow that matters during plea
negotiations. The shadow of the trial drives the outcome for some, while
for others, what matters are broader, sometimes extra-legal factors. We
call this expanded theory a negotiation in the "shadow of the client."
The alternative "shadow of the client" theory of negotiation
applies, to some degree, to all types of attorneys. But the choice between
the two shadow theories is not random, either. The influence of the

11 See infra Section IV.A; Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargainingin the Shadow
of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 968-69 (1979).
12 See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.2 (AM. BAR. ASS'N 1983) (stating that lawyers
"shall abide by a client's decision[s]" concerning the objectives of representation); MODEL RULES
OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.4 (AM. BAR. ASS'N 1983) (stating that lawyers shall "reasonably consult
with the client about the means by which the client's objectives are to be accomplished").
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"shadow of the client" theory is strongest among attorneys who place
the greatest weight during negotiations on a client's pretrial custody and
on collateral consequences. On the other hand, attorneys with the most
years of experience as public defenders and those who emphasize the

importance of suppression of evidence issues tend more often to adopt
the "shadow of the trial" theory. We conducted a multivariate analysis
of the survey results to understand how these different background
factors interact to produce two distinctive negotiation theories.
Our discussion of negotiation theory and practice follows a simple
organization. In Part II, we review the empirical scholarly literature on

plea bargains, including its emphasis on the outcomes and the lesser
attention devoted to the bargaining process itself. In Part III, we
describe the methodology of our survey, evaluating the limits and
potential of this data. Then in Part IV, we analyze what attorneys

declare to be important in the bargaining process. We detail how their
priorities stress either the shadow of the trial or the shadow of the
client's expressed wants and needs as the primary influence on their
preparation for negotiation.

Finally, Part V tests the self-declared negotiation goals of defense
lawyers, measured against what they assert about their actual practices
during negotiation. Their self-described habits depart in important

ways from their own declared vision of sound negotiation practices. For
example, when it comes to fact investigation, file review appears to be
the strong suit of defense attorneys across all types of cases. Other forms
of factual investigation, such as witness interviews and site visits, occur
less often, even in categories of cases where such investigation might
prove useful. As for knowledge of the relevant law, attorneys say that
they engage in research less often than they investigate facts. This is
particularly true of misdemeanor attorneys, where the client could often

benefit from testing the legal viability of the prosecution's case. Finally,
defense attorneys tend to remain passive in the timing of their
negotiations, waiting in most cases for the prosecution to make a first
offer. This timing habit persists even in those situations where a first
offer from the defense is unlikely to do any harm.

In each of these aspects of negotiation, defense attorneys report
practices that do not measure up to the shadow of the client theory of

bargaining. They leave unexplored some viable options that the client
might prefer, leading to bargains that were negotiated outside the
shadow of the client's interests.

THE SHADOW BARGAINERS
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THE OUTPUTS, THE INPUTS, AND THE KITCHEN

The empirical study of plea bargaining extends back for almost a
century.1 3 Early on, this field work examined the outputs of the process,
such as changes in the disposition method for cases filed, the speed of
case disposition, or the severity of sentences. Later work examined the
inputs that shaped those guilty plea outcomes: the nature of the charges,
the quality of the evidence to prove those charges, the characteristics of
the full-time actors who work in the criminal courts, and the local
institutional environment.
Indulging in a culinary metaphor, we think of the inputs to plea
negotiations as the ingredients and the outputs as the dishes that emerge
from the restaurant kitchen. Empirical research tells us a lot about the
ingredients and the dishes but far less about what happens inside the
kitchen-the sequence of offers and counteroffers, the priorities of the
prosecutor and defense lawyer, and the effects of local negotiation
practices on the plea deal. In this Part, we highlight a few examples from
the profuse scholarship about the inputs and outputs, before turning to
the limited empirical scholarship about what happens in the kitchen.
A.

Outputs and Inputs

The outputs of plea negotiations attracted the attention of criminal
justice scholars in the early twentieth century. A series of state-level
studies during the 1920s and 1930s announced the discovery of a
surprising new reality in the criminal courts: the large proportion of
criminal cases resolved through "compromises" rather than trials.14 The
relative importance of trials and guilty pleas remains a topic of interest
to legal scholars, criminologists, and others.15
Output scholarship also deals with the precise forms that these
compromises take. Sometimes they result in reduced charges, while in
other settings the negotiations lead to lower recommended sentences

13 See Brian D. Johnson, Ryan D. King, & Cassia Spohn, Sociolegal Approaches to the Study
of Guilty Pleas and Prosecution, 12 ANN. REV. L. & Soc. SCI. 479 (2016) (overviewing empirical
research on plea outcomes and referring to three waves of scholarship).
14 See Justin Miller, The Compromise of Criminal Cases, 1 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1927); Raymond
Moley, The Vanishing Jury, 2 S. CAL. L. REV. 97 (1928); CLEVELAND FOUND., CRIMINAL JUSTICE
IN CLEVELAND (Felix Frankfurter & Roscoe Pound eds., 1922).
15 See, e.g., Kyle Graham, Crimes, Widgets, and Plea Bargaining: An Analysis of Charge
Content, Pleas, and Trials, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 1573 (2012); Ilene H. Nagel & Stephen J. Schulhofer,
A Tale of Three Cities:An Empirical Study of Chargingand BargainingPracticesUnder the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 501 (1992).
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even without a reduction of charges.16 Access to court data allows

scholars to study sentencing severity and the differential between
outcomes after trial and after a guilty plea-the gap known as a "trial
penalty" or "plea discount."17 Various field studies also examine the
output effects of attempts to ban plea bargaining. 18 Finally, the accuracy

of convictions based on guilty pleas became a serious concern for
empirical investigation after the advent of the "innocence movement."19
Scholars of plea bargaining also address the ingredients or inputs
into the plea bargaining process. The literature about the historical
origins of plea bargaining tries to explain the conditions that led to
growth in this method of resolving criminal charges.20 Field studies
track the influence of judges,21 prosecutors,22 law enforcement officers,23

16 See Terance D. Miethe & Charles A. Moore, Socioeconomic Disparities Under Determinate
Sentencing Systems: A Comparison of Preguideline and Postguideline Practices in Minnesota, 23
CRIMINOLOGY 337 (1985); Ruth G. Weintraub & Rosalind Tough, Lesser Pleas Considered, 32 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 506 (1942) (analyzing documents that the New York legislature in
1936 required prosecutor to file with court to state reasons for accepting a plea to a lesser charge).
17 See, e.g., David S. Abrams, Is Pleading Really a Bargain?, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 200
(2011); David Brereton & Jonathan D. Casper, Does It Pay to Plead Guilty? Differential Sentencing
and the Functioning of Criminal Courts, 16 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 45 (1981); Shawn D. Bushway,
Allison D. Redlich, & Robert J. Norris, An Explicit Test of Plea Bargaining in the "Shadow of the
Trial", 52 CRIMINOLOGY 723 (2014).
18 See Milton Heumann & Colin Loftin, Mandatory Sentencing and the Abolition of Plea
Bargaining: The Michigan Felony Firearm Statute, 13 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 393 (1979); Malcolm D.
Holmes, Howard C. Daudistel, & William A. Taggart, Plea Bargaining Policy and State District
Court Caseloads: An Interrupted Time Series Analysis, 26 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 139 (1992); Robert
A. Weninger, The Abolition of Plea Bargaining: A Case Study of El Paso County, Texas, 35 UCLA
L. REV. 265 (1987).
19 See Miko M. Wilford & Annmarie Khairalla, Innocence and Plea Bargaining, in A SYSTEM
OF PLEAS: SOCIAL SCIENCE'S CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE REAL LEGAL SYSTEM 132 (Vanessa A.

Edkins & Allison D. Redlich eds., 2019); Oren Gazal-Ayal & Avishalom Tor, The Innocence Effect,
62 DUKE L.J. 339 (2012); Ronald F. Wright, Trial Distortion and the End of Innocence in Federal
Criminal Justice, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 79 (2005).
20 See GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING'S TRIUMPH: A HISTORY OF PLEA BARGAINING IN

AMERICA (2003); Albert W. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1
(1979).
21 See MILTON HEUMANN, PLEA BARGAINING: THE EXPERIENCES OF PROSECUTORS, JUDGES,
AND DEFENSE ATIORNEYS 127-152 (1981); PAMELA J. UTZ, SETTLING THE FACTS: DISCRETION
AND NEGOTIATION IN CRIMINAL COURT (1978); Brown, supra note 1.

22 See Josh Bowers, Grassroots Plea Bargaining, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 85 (2007) (prosecutor
priorities in community relationships); Richard T. Boylan & Cheryl X. Long, Salaries, Plea Rates,
and the Career Objectives of Federal Prosecutors, 48 J.L. & ECON. 627 (2005) (prosecutor priorities
in career development); Bryan C. McCannon, Prosecutor Elections, Mistakes, and Appeals, 10 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 696 (2013) (prosecutor interest in re-election).
23 See Jonathan Abel, Cops and Pleas: Police Officers' Influence on Plea Bargaining, 126 YALE
L.J. 1730 (2017).
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and defense counsel in the selection of cases for early resolution.24 The
relationships among the actors within courtroom workgroups also get
scrutiny.25
Criminologists, economists, political scientists, and criminal
justice scholars have contributed important insights about the raw
materials available to the bargaining parties in local courts. The volume
of cases in the court system seems to increase the number of pleas.26 The
seriousness of the charges,27 the statutory charge and sentence options
available to the negotiators,2 8 bail practices,29 and the policies of the
offices where the negotiators work all influence the number and type of
pleas.30 Victim characteristics have some effect on negotiated
outcomes. 3' The gender,32 race-ethnicity,33 and other characteristics of

24 See Kelsey S. Henderson, Defense Attorneys and Plea Bargains, in A SYSTEM OF PLEAS:
SOCIAL SCIENCE'S CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE REAL LEGAL SYSTEM 37 (Vanessa A. Edkins & Allison

D. Redlich eds., 2019).
25 See Jo Dixon, The OrganizationalContext of Criminal Sentencing, 100 AM.

J. SOCI0. 1157

(1995); JAMES EISENSTEIN, ROY B. FLEMMING, & PETER F. NARDULLI, THE CONTOURS OF JUSTICE:
COMMUNITIES AND THEIR COURTS (1988).

&

26 See Milton Heumann, A Note on Plea Bargainingand Case Pressure,9 LAW & SOC'Y REV.
515 (1975); Crystal S. Yang, Resource Constraintsand the CriminalJustice System: Evidencefrom
JudicialVacancies, 8 AM. ECON. J.: ECON. POL'Y 289 (2016).
27 See Richard T. Boylan, The Effect of Punishment Severity on Plea Bargaining, 55 J.L.
ECON. 565 (2012); Lynn M. Mather, Some Determinants of the Method of Case Disposition:
Decision-Makingby Public Defenders in Los Angeles, 8 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 187 (1973).
28 See Oren Gazal-Ayal, Hagit Turjeman, & Gideon Fishman, Do Sentencing Guidelines
Increase ProsecutorialPower? An Empirical Study, 76 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 131 (2013);
Stephen E. Vance & J.C. Oleson, Displaced Discretion: The Effects of Sentencing Guidelines on
Prosecutors'Charge Bargainingin the Districtof Columbia Superior Court, 25 CRIM. JUST. POL'Y
REV. 347 (2014); Ronald F. Wright & Rodney L. Engen, The Effects of Depth and Distance in a
CriminalCode on Charging, Sentencing, and ProsecutorPower, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1935 (2006).
29 See, e.g., Paul Heaton, Sandra Mayson, & Megan Stevenson, The Downstream
Consequences of Misdemeanor Pretrial Detention, 69 STAN. L. REV. 711, 717, 731-32 (2017);
Bibas, supra note 7.
30 See Gary D. LaFree, Adversarial and NonadversarialJustice: A Comparison of Guilty Pleas
and Trials, 23 CRIMINOLOGY 289 (1985) (demonstrating that plea outcomes are more consistent
in jurisdictions with more oversight of prosecutorial practices).
31 See CASSIA SPOHN & KATHARINE TELLIS, POLICING & PROSECUTING SEXUAL ASSAULT:
INSIDE THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (2014).

32 See Carlos Berdej6, GenderDisparitiesin PleaBargaining,94 IND. L.J. 1247 (2019); Josefina
Figueira-McDonough, Gender Differences in Informal Processing: A Look at Charge Bargaining
and Sentence Reduction in Washington, D.C., 22 J. RSCH. CRIME & DELINQ. 101 (1985); Donna
M. Bishop & Charles E. Frazier, The Effects of Gender on Charge Reduction, 25 SOCIO. Q. 385
(1984).
33 See Carlos Berdej6, Criminalizing Race: Racial Disparitiesin Plea Bargaining,59 B.C. L.
REV. 1187 (2018); Alexander Testa & Brian D. Johnson, Paying the Trial Tax: Race, Guilty Pleas,
and Disparity in Prosecution, 31 CRIM. JUST. POL'Y REV. 500 (2019); BESIKI KUTATELADZE,
VANESSA LYNN, & EDWARD LIANG, VERA INST. OF JUST., DO RACE AND ETHNICITY MATTER IN
PROSECUTION? A REVIEW OF EMPIRICAL STUDIES (2012).
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defendants also explain some aspects of plea bargaining outcomes.
Strength of evidence gets its moment in the spotlight as well.35
B.

34

In the Kitchen

The transformation of ingredients into dishes-what happens in
the restaurant kitchen-attracts less empirical inquiry. The mechanics
of bargaining for a possible guilty plea include the preparations of the
attorneys, the interactions between the prosecutor and the defense
attorney, the sequence of their offers, the methods of persuasion they
use, the relationships between the bargainers, and many connected
topics. As criminologists Johnson, King, and Spohn noted recently,
"few studies include adequate information about the actual negotiated
plea bargaining process."36 The field work, they said, does not "capture
the dynamic and recursive nature of plea bargaining."37 This problem is

evergreen, as socio-legal scholars periodically notice the scarcity of field
research into the plea bargaining process. 38
Despite the paucity of research on the bargaining part of plea
bargains, a few empirical studies are relevant to our project. Albert
Alschuler opened the door to the plea bargaining kitchen with his
seminal field studies of ten urban jurisdictions during the 1960s and
1970s. He catalogued bargaining practices through interviews with
34 See Ilene Nagel Bernstein, Edward Kick, Jan T. Leung & Barbara Schulz, Charge Reduction:
An Intermediary Stage in the Process of Labelling Criminal Defendants, 56 SOC. FORCES 362
(1977) (age of defendant); Richard Birke, Reconciling Loss Aversion and Guilty Pleas, 1999 UTAH
L. REV. 205 (discussing limits on defendant's capacity to process future prospects rationally).
35 See Kenneth Adams, The Effect of Evidentiary Factors on Charge Reduction, 11 J. CRIM.
JUST. 525 (1983); Michael O. Finkelstein, A Statistical Analysis of Guilty Plea Practices in the
Federal Courts, 89 HARV. L. REV. 293 (1975); Besiki L. Kutateladze, Victoria Z. Lawson, & Nancy
R. Andiloro, Does Evidence Really Matter? An Exploratory Analysis of the Role of Evidence in Plea
Bargaining in Felony Drug Cases, 39 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 431 (2015); BRUCE FREDERICK & DON
STEMEN, VERA INST. OF JUST., THE ANATOMY OF DISCRETION: AN ANALYSIS OF PROSECUTORIAL
DECISION MAKING (2012).

36 Johnson et al., supra note 13, at 489.
37 Id. at 487.
38 See Greg M. Kramer, Melinda Wolbransky, & Kirk Heilbrun, Plea Bargaining
Recommendations by Criminal Defense Attorneys: Evidence Strength, Potential Sentence, and
Defendant Preference, 25 BEHAV. SCIS. & L. 573, 574 (2007) ("[T]here has been limited empirical
research to date on plea bargaining-and almost none conducted recently."); Stephen P. Lagoy,
Joseph J. Senna, & Larry J. Siegel, An Empirical Study on Information Usage for Prosecutorial
Decision Making in Plea Negotiations, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 435, 437 (1975) ("[L]egal scholars
have directed their inquiries and analyses more to studying the relative merits of plea bargaining
than to examining the process by which bargains are actually made."); Gary T. Lowenthal,
Theoretical Notes on Lawyer Competency and an Overview of the Phoenix Criminal Lawyer Study,
1981 ARIz. STATE L.J. 451, 485 ("[L]ittle empirical research has been conducted to examine the
actual practices of criminal defense lawyers in processing cases.").
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defense counse,39 prosecutors, judges, and other courtroom regulars.40
Despite its informal journalistic methodology, this work identified key
areas that still influence the plea bargaining process, including
discovery, strategic delay, judge shopping, judicial pressure,
relationships with clients, and case load.41
Over the years since Alschuler interviewed courtroom actors,
empirical insights about bargaining practices have arrived through a
variety of research methods. The most straightforward studies involve
sporadic surveys of defense counsel, asking in general terms about the
bargaining practices they typically use or witness. For example, one
1980s survey of 173 criminal defense lawyers in Maricopa County,
Arizona "questioned public defenders and private practitioners about
their opinions and attitudes toward plea bargaining, and their actual
preparation for plea negotiation."42 A smaller but more geographically
3
diverse group of defenders completed a similar questionnaire.4 Given

39 See Albert W. Alschuler, The Defense Attorney's Role in Plea Bargaining,84 YALE L.J. 1179
(1975). Earlier field work was based in part on field interviews, but the authors used their
interview findings in a more peripheral role, keeping the focus on the outputs of the bargaining
process. See DONALD J. NEWMAN, CONVICTION: THE DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE
WITHOUT TRIAL 200 (1966).

40 See Albert W. Alschuler, The Prosecutor'sRole in Plea Bargaining,36 U. CHI. L. REV. 50
(1968); Albert W. Alschuler, The Trial Judge's Role in Plea Bargaining,PartI, 76 COLUM. L. REV.
1059 (1976).
41 See Anne M. Heinz & Wayne A. Kerstetter, PretrialSettlement Conference: Evaluation of a
Reform in Plea Bargaining, 13 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 349 (1979) (evaluating the use of pretrial
settlement conference as a means of restructuring plea negotiations in Florida and finding that
the victims in the test category were more satisfied with the conference process because it reduced
the processing time); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Is Plea BargainingInevitable?, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1037
(1984) (supporting the thesis that bench trials in the jurisdiction are not simply "slow guilty
pleas" with courtroom observation of 340 criminal cases and informal interviews with a variety
of actors, including defenders in Philadelphia).
42 Marty Lieberman, Note, Investigation of Facts in Preparationfor Plea Bargaining, 1981
ARIZ. STATE L.J. 557, 560-61, 568 tbl.1; see also Lance B. Payette, Note, Adequacy of Criminal
Defense Lawyers' Preparationfor Sentencing, 1981 ARIZ. STATE L.J. 585 (reporting survey
responses related to preparation for sentencing hearings).
43 See Robert L. Doyel, The National College-MercerCriminal Defense Survey: Preliminary
Observations About Interviewing, Counseling, and Plea Negotiations, 37 MERCER L. REV. 1019,
1020, 1022 (1986) (defenders rated the ability to negotiate as more important than the ability to
get along with opposing counsel). In addition, despite rating the skill of negotiation as very
important to pre-trial practice, one half of respondents "did not conduct a thorough
investigation, do legal research, or develop a theory of defense before plea negotiations." Id. at
1026. Attorneys also listed creativity-meaning the ability to fashion sentencing alternatives-as
important to effective bargaining. Id. at 1028; see Daniel L. Rotenberg, The Progress of Plea
Bargaining: The ABA Standards and Beyond, 8 CONN. L. REV. 44 (1975) (surveying judges and
attorneys in five states about the influence of ABA Standards on actual practice).
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the age and limited geographic reach of these two studies, they offer
only modest insight about current practices.44
Similar findings come from a few field interviews that call for
criminal practitioners to characterize their bargaining practices in
general terms. 45 The interviews often extend to all of the regular
courthouse actors, in an effort to capture the subtleties of local culture.46
Direct observations of plea negotiations in a single courthouse have also

provided a few glimpses behind the kitchen door.47
44 In the National College study, there were only fifty responses from defenders. Doyel, supra
note 43, at 1020. Surveys of defense attorneys, asking attorneys to report on the general
conditions of their legal practice, continue to offer insights about specific jurisdictions. For
instance, a 2010 survey of defense counsel by the MinnPost newspaper posed twenty-three
questions to public defenders around the state with the goal of examining defenders' ability to
adequately prepare clients' cases. See Jeff Severns Guntzel, Minnesota's Public Defenders Speak:
Results of the MinnPost Survey, MINNPOST (Dec. 13, 2010), http://www.minnpost.com/
intelligencer/2010/12/minnesotas-public-defenders-speak-results-minnpost-survey
[https://perma.cc/AG8E-A3DQ]; Jeff Severns Guntzel, Tara Bannow, Kristin Lueck, Casey
Peterson, & Marisa Washington, Minnesota's Public Defenders Paint Bleak Picture of Justice for
the Poor, MINNPOST (Dec. 13, 2010), http://www.minnpost.com/intelligencer/2010/12/
minnesotas-public-defenders-paint-bleak-picture-justice-poor [https://perma.cc/K428-HLXD].
45 See Thea Johnson, Measuring the Creative Plea Bargain, 92 IND. L.J. 901 (2017)
(investigating the impact of collateral consequences in plea negotiations through interviews with
twenty-five public defenders in four states); see also David Sudnow, Normal Crimes: Sociological
Features of the Penal Code in a Public Defender Office, 12 SOC. PROBS. 255, 259-61 (1965)
(quoting interviewees). For a rare study on bargaining from the defendant's perspective, see
Kenneth S. Bordens & John Bassett, The Plea Bargaining Process from the Defendant's Perspective:
A Field Investigation, 6 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCH. 93 (1985) (describing a study that included
interviews with sixty-seven defendants and identifying significant factors contributing to plea
bargain acceptance).

46 See MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES IN A

LOWER CRIMINAL COURT (1979) (studying misdemeanor court in New Haven, Connecticut);
LYNN M. MATHER, PLEA BARGAINING OR TRIAL? THE PROCESS OF CRIMINAL-CASE DISPOSITION

&

(1979) (developing consensus model of plea negotiation as manifested in Los Angeles);
HEUMANN, supra note 21, at 47-91 (explaining defense attorneys' adaptation to the unexpected
dominance of plea bargaining through interviews, supplemented by courtroom observation and
disposition statistics). A number of scholars also draw on anecdotal observations from their own
or others' prior practice experiences to explain actual negotiation practices. See Cynthia Alkon,
Hard Bargaining in Plea Bargaining: When Do Prosecutors Cross the Line?, 17 NEV. L.J. 401
(2017); David Lynch, The Impropriety of Plea Agreements: A Tale of Two Counties, 19 LAW
SOC. INQUIRY 115 (1994) (describing the author's anecdotal observations about plea bargaining
from working as a prosecutor and defender).
47 See Deirdre M. Bowen, Calling Your Bluff How Prosecutors and Defense Attorneys Adapt
Plea Bargaining Strategies to Increased Formalization, 26 JUST. Q. 2 (2009) (describing results
where the author viewed forty-two plea negotiations in one district, supplemented by attorney
interviews and review of disposition data). Bowen's study was limited to one unit in one urban
jurisdiction (with only one assigned prosecutor) that handled only low-level, non-violent felony
cases. Still, it remains one of the best multi-dimensional looks inside the bargaining room. See
also Debra S. Emmelman, Gauging the Strength of Evidence Prior to Plea Bargaining: The
Interpretive Procedures of Court-Appointed Defense Attorneys, 22 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 927, 928
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Surveys sometimes pose hypothetical cases for attorneys to resolve,
based on the practices they normally employ. For instance, a 1986 study
used case vignettes to demonstrate that when the severity of the
sentence and probability of conviction increased, prosecutors became
less willing to plea bargain and defense attorneys became more willing
to do so. 48
While the empirical picture of defense attorney negotiation
practices is sketchy, the portrait on the prosecutorial side of the
bargaining process offers more detail. A number of older studies take a
close empirical look at various influences on prosecutor decisions
during negotiation.49 After several quiet decades, field research about
prosecutor bargaining choices has been reinvigorated lately.S0 Similarly,
(1997) (explaining that court-appointed defense attorneys assess the "strength of evidence
through a tacit, taken-for-granted process that emulates trial proceedings" (emphasis omitted));
DOUGLAS W. MAYNARD, INSIDE PLEA BARGAINING: THE LANGUAGE OF NEGOTIATION (1984)

&

(distinguishing between routine cases and customized negotiations in California).
48 See Hunter A. McAllister & Norman J. Bregman, Plea Bargaining by Prosecutors and
Defense Attorneys: A Decision Theory Approach, 71 J. APPLIED PSYCH. 686 (1986) (using decision
theory to posit that negotiations in criminal cases are based on predictions of likely trial
outcomes). A later vignette-based survey, completed by 186 "criminal defense attorneys in the
metropolitan area of a large, east coast city in the United States," also asked respondents to rate
the importance of ten variables in their decision-making about plea bargain recommendations.
Greg M. Kramer, Melinda Wolbransky, & Kirk Heilbrun, Plea BargainingRecommendations by
CriminalDefense Attorneys: Evidence Strength, PotentialSentence, and Defendant Preference, 25
BEHAV. SCIS. & L. 573, 577, 580 tbl.2 (2007) (rating the judge assigned to the case as highly
important; rating defender's high current caseload as low in importance); see also Avishalom Tor,
Oren Gazal-Ayal, & Stephen M. Garcia, Fairness and the Willingness to Accept Plea Bargain
Offers, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 97 (2010) (demonstrating an experimental method asking
defendants to accept or reject offers under controlled variations in strength of evidence and
indicators of comparative fairness).
49 See, e.g., Julie Horney, Plea BargainingDecision Factors, in 17 IMPROVING MANAGEMENT
IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 73 (Alvin W. Cohn & Benjamin Ward eds., 1980); James E. Bond, Plea
Bargainingin North Carolina, 54 N.C. L. REV. 823, 824, 839 (1976) (describing results of a "free
form" survey completed by twenty prosecutors in North Carolina, which demonstrate "process"
and "internal management" issues in plea bargaining); Francis J. Carney & Ann L. Fuller, A Study
of Plea Bargaining in Murder Cases in Massachusetts, 3 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 292 (1969); J.A.
Gilboy, Guilty Plea Negotiations and the Exclusionary Rule of Evidence: A Case Study of Chicago
Narcotics Courts, 67 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 89 (1976) (describing, based on observations in
court and interviews, how prosecutors appear to follow office policy to make sentence offers
independent of whether defense files motion to suppress); Lagoy et al., supra note 38.
50 The Vera Institute of Justice published a study of prosecutorial decision-making in two
mid-sized cities, including the formulation of plea offers, using vignettes, focus groups, and a
survey. See FREDERICK & STEMEN, supra note 35 (demonstrating that the strength of evidence
dominated prosecutors' thinking during initial selection of charge; broader justice concerns grew
more important during formulation of plea offer). A Stanford study considered prosecutorial
charging in California under that state's public safety realignment laws. W. DAVID BALL
ROBERT WEISBERG, STAN. CRIM. JUST. CTR., THE NEW NORMAL? PROSECUTORIAL CHARGING IN
CALIFORNIA AFTER PUBLIC SAFETY REALIGNMENT (2014); see also Anna Offit, Prosecutingin the
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the empirical account of the judge's role in plea negotiation was
developed in early studies,5' with recently renewed interest in the

topic.52
In sum, the empirical studies of defense counsel practices during
plea negotiations rely on multiple methods, but they do not provide as

much depth as the studies of judges or prosecutors. In particular, there
is little multi-jurisdictional research on the defense side.s3 Furthermore,
the empirical scholarship, taken together, does not generate or test any
theories of negotiation.

III.

SURVEY METHODOLOGY

Early theoretical accounts of plea bargaining stressed the rational
prediction by the relevant actors of likely outcomes after trial.54 Over
the years, these accounts of plea negotiations made greater allowances
for decision-making that went beyond a pure trial-outcome analysis, as

&

Shadow of the Jury, 113 Nw. U. L. REV. 1071 (2019) (finding that prosecutors evaluate cases in
light of likely jury responses, even in cases unlikely to proceed to jury trial, based on interviews
and questionnaires with vignettes); Christopher Robertson, Shima Baradaran Baughman,
Megan S. Wright, Race and Class: A Randomized Experiment with Prosecutors, 16 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 807 (2019) (vignettes).
51 See Albert W. Alschuler, The Trial Judge's Role in Plea Bargaining, Part I, supra note 40;
John Paul Ryan & James J. Alfmi, Trial Judges' Participation in Plea Bargaining: An Empirical
Perspective, 13 LAw & SOC'Y REV. 479, 484-85 (1979) (surveying twenty jurisdictions in fifteen
states).
52 See Nancy J. King & Ronald F. Wright, The Invisible Revolution in Plea Bargaining:
Managerial Judging and Judicial Participation in Negotiations, 95 TEX. L. REV. 325 (2016); Colin
Miller, Anchors Away: Why the Anchoring Effect Suggests that Judges Should Be Able to
Participate in Plea Discussions, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1667 (2013).
53 The available empirical works focus more heavily on the interaction between defense
attorneys and clients. See Erika N. Fountain & Jennifer L. Woolard, How Defense Attorneys
Consult with Juvenile Clients About Plea Bargains, 24 PSYCH., PUB. POL'Y, & L. 192 (2018);
Rodney J. Uphoff & Peter B. Wood, The Allocation of Decisionmaking Between Defense Counsel
and Criminal Defendant: An Empirical Study of Attorney-Client Decisionmaking, 47 U. KAN. L.
REV. 1 (1998) (describing a study of five public defender offices with almost 700 public defenders,
on a variety of topics relating to lawyer-client decision-making processes, including plea bargain
decisions).
54 See William M. Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J.L. & ECON. 61 (1971).
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detailed in behavioral economics.55 Until now, however, not much
empirical investigation has tested the evolving theory.56
In light of this gap, 57 we wanted to find out more about the defense
attorney's objectives during plea negotiations. More specifically, we
hoped to learn whether defense attorneys embrace the economic
insights built into the "shadow of the trial" negotiation theory, or if they
instead pursue an alternative set of negotiation objectives.
Our field study involved two mutually reinforcing sources of
evidence. First, we conducted fifteen semi-structured interviews in
eight public defender offices, divided among four different states. These
field interviews lasted thirty to sixty minutes each. The recorded
interviews touched on topics such as local prosecution office policies
about plea offers, informal rules of bargaining, and sentencing laws and

practices.
Those interviews helped us refine the questions to ask in an online
survey. 58 We distributed the survey to 2,265 public defenders, working
in thirty-one offices across thirteen states. 59 Responses came from 579

55 See, e.g., Alafair S. Burke, Improving Prosecutorial Decision Making: Some Lessons of
Cognitive Science, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1587 (2006); Russell Covey, Reconsidering the
Relationship Between Cognitive Psychology and Plea Bargaining, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 213 (2007);
Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, Getting to "Guilty": Plea Bargainingas Negotiation,2 HARV. NEGOT.
L. REV. 115 (1997); Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, Social Psychology, Information Processing, and
Plea Bargaining,91 MARQ. L. REV. 163, 165 (2007) ("seek[ing] to explain perception and decision
making as a function of myriad individual and social factors"); Chad M. Oldfather, Heuristics,
Biases, and Criminal Defendants, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 249 (2007) (cautioning that behavioral
economics research may not apply in the same manner to individuals facing criminal charges as
it does to individuals in other situations); Bibas, supra note 7; Birke, supra note 34, at 207-08.
56 For one of the few empirical tests of the theory, see Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Cooperating
or Caving In: Are Defense Attorneys Shrewd or Exploited in Plea Bargaining Negotiations?, 91
MARQ. L. REV. 145, 155 (2007) (finding that 86% of defense attorneys were perceived as problemsolving, almost 20% more than prosecutors and more than any other practice area).
57 Although not focused on plea bargaining, the Uphoff-Wood survey from the 1990s
garnered responses from multiple public defenders in offices in large urban jurisdictions around
the United States. This important work examined the allocation of decision-making authority
between defense counsel and client and is instructive for distribution and survey design purposes.
See Uphoff & Wood, supra note 53.
58 We pre-tested a draft of the instrument with colleagues who are former defenders.
59 An attorney from the leadership sent an email message to staff attorneys just before the
arrival of the survey link, saying that the leadership encouraged but did not require completion
of the survey. The survey responses were anonymous. The participating offices employed as
many as 290 and as few as three attorneys; twelve of the thirty-one offices employed twenty-five
or more attorneys. We also selected six offices that are funded and controlled at the local level.
See DONALD J. FAROLE, JR. & LYNN LANGTON, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUST. STAT.,
COUNTY-BASED AND LOCAL PUBLIC DEFENDER OFFICES, 2007 (2010). Twenty-five other

participating offices are funded and controlled at the state level. See id. Differences in survey
responses based on distinctions among types of offices or geographic regions deserve separate
attention, but they fall outside the scope of this Article.
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attorneys, for a response rate of 26%. Of those responding attorneys,
44% identified as female; among those who indicated race or ethnicity,
86% were white, 8% African American, and 4% Hispanic. In terms of

seniority, 36% of the respondents had zero to five years of experience as
defense attorneys. There were 15% with experience between six and

nine years, 29% between ten and twenty years, and 20% with more than
twenty years of experience. A significant minority (12%) worked as
prosecutors at some point before taking their current positions as public
defenders.

As for their current assignments, 21% of the responding attorneys
were devoted to representing clients charged with misdemeanors,
spending more than half of their hours on misdemeanor cases. 60 About
40% of the attorneys spent more than half of their hours on general
felony matters, and 8% of the attorneys specialized in particular types
of felonies.61
The survey asked first about the relative importance of various
influences during typical negotiations. It went on to ask for details
about the timing of negotiations, the frequency of various discovery
practices, characteristics of first offers, the duration of negotiations, the
channels of communication, the frequency of various negotiation
tactics, activities of the attorney in preparation for bargaining,
consultation with peers about bargaining, and training about
bargaining.62
We use several methods to analyze the survey responses. Simple
descriptive statistics allow us to spot potential patterns, where attorneys
from one type of background answered questions differently from
attorneys from another background.
It is important for us to consider how the answers to different
survey questions interacted with one another, so we also conduct a
multivariate analysis. We divide the answers to several survey questions
60 These were non-traffic adult misdemeanors.
61 In addition to the categories described in the text, we grouped smaller specialties into a
category designated as "Other." Within this category, attorneys working on juvenile matters
accounted for 7%, and other non-felony units (such as traffic, appeals, or administration)
accounted for 5% of our responses. About 19% of the respondents indicated a variety of case
types in their portfolio (with no single type rising above half the caseload) or did not indicate a
type of caseload at all. In Part IV, discussing the survey findings, we use the term "caseload type"
to refer to the category of cases that defenders handle for a majority of their time.
62 The survey questions are available online at https://drive.google.com/file/d/
ljWB2rByFxpGOYOjnt7XYMNVOArv12oT/view?usp=sharing
[https://perma.cc/73K3UYBB]. We divided our survey questions into four sections: Background, Negotiation Practices,
Preparation for Bargaining, and Training about Negotiation. We discussed responses to the
Training sections of the survey in a prior article. Roberts & Wright, supra note 9, at 1145-46
(describing how survey responses, as well as review of training materials, supported hypothesis
that public defenders receive little to no training specific to negotiation practice).
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into content groups. One set of questions deals with case
characteristics.63 A second group addresses the background,
64
characteristics, and experiences of the defense attorney. Questions in
the third group speak to the courthouse environment where
negotiations take place.65 A fourth group addresses the attorneys'
expressed beliefs about important negotiation objectives, which
indicate an embrace of the shadow-of-trial theory or the shadow-ofclient theory of negotiation. 66
We believe that case characteristics, attorney background,
courthouse environment, and attorney beliefs about negotiation
objectives influence the way that attorneys prepare for negotiation. Put
another way, we hypothesize that answers to the first four groups of
questions (independent variables) should show a statistically significant
association with some survey answers related to preparation for
bargaining (the dependent variables).67

One final group of questions deals with attorney practices during
negotiation. They include several factors that we associate with a
shadow-of-trial theory; other behavioral claims we connect to a
shadow-of-client theory.68 An additional layer of analyses asks whether
63 They include survey answers about the attorney's type of caseload (misdemeanor, general
felony, specialized felony, juvenile, traffic, and other, designating general felony as the reference
category); frequency of client experiencing a trial penalty; importance of suppression issues to
negotiated outcome; importance of collateral consequences to negotiated outcome; importance
of client's custody status to negotiated outcome; and importance of client's criminal history to
negotiated outcome.
64 These include the attorney's race (African American, Asian, Hispanic, Native American,
White, Other Race, with attorneys able to select more than one race, combining responses into
White and Non-White); the attorney's gender; years of experience as a defense attorney; number
of jury trials the attorney has litigated; number of bench trials the attorney has litigated;
importance of the attorney's reputation as a trial attorney to negotiated outcomes; and prior
experience of the defense attorney as a prosecutor.
65 These include the importance of prosecutor office policy to negotiated outcomes;
importance of prosecutor's caseload to negotiated outcomes; and importance of defense
attorney's relationship with the prosecutor to negotiated outcomes.
66 They include the importance of the likelihood of conviction to negotiated outcomes, the
importance of the judge's likely sentencing decision to negotiated outcomes, and the importance
of the client's wants and needs to negotiated outcomes.
67 We used two of these variables as indicators of a shadow-of-trial theory of negotiation at
work: the importance of predicting trial outcomes as part of preparation for negotiation and the
importance of predicting a sentencing outcome as part of preparation. Two other variables
indicate for us the operation of a shadow-of-client theory: the importance of a clear sense of the
client's goals as part of preparation to bargain and the importance of attorney knowledge of
alternatives to incarceration.
68 The behaviors that we associate with shadow of trial are (1) high frequency of signaling
plans to conduct a vigorous motions practice, (2) high frequency of bluffing about potential
defenses at trial, and (3) high frequency of waiting for prosecutor to initiate negotiations. The
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answers from the first five groups (case characteristics, attorney
characteristics, courthouse environment, beliefs about negotiation
objectives, and preparation for negotiation) have any combined effect

on self-reported practices during negotiation.69
The design of this study imposes some important limitations on
us. First, because we asked defenders to report their own bargaining
practices, we should interpret their responses with care. Self-reported
data from surveys used in other contexts (such as policing) routinely
lead to results that cast the study subjects in too favorable a light.
Predictably, the respondents hesitate to report themselves as departing
from ethical requirements, relevant policies, or best practices.70 This
limitation applies most emphatically to survey answers dealing with
attorney descriptions of their own performance for clients; it also
applies, but perhaps with less force, to answers related to negotiation
practices in general.

Second, we did not obtain access to caseflow data from the courts
across the thirty-one jurisdictions we studied. That data might have

offered some check on the accuracy of defense attorney claims about
the volume and types of cases in the system. But the collection of data
from these far-flung court systems was not feasible for this study.
Finally, given the voluntary nature of the survey, we probably received

responses from the most active and conscientious defense attorneys in
each office.
Despite these limitations, we believe that self-reported survey
answers offer some insights about activities that are difficult to study
because they generally take place behind closed doors with no other
parties present. 71 In particular, these answers merit our attention when
behaviors we associate with a shadow-of-client approach to negotiation are (4) high frequency of
exploring collateral consequences and (5) high frequency of sharing new information with
prosecutor before trial.
69 We used ordered logistic analyses given that the dependent variables are categorical and
ordered, ranging from one to five. We describe in the Appendix further details about the
dependent and independent variables used for different models, along with the results for each
model.
70 See Josine Junger-Tas & Ineke Haen Marshall, The Self-Report Methodology in Crime
Research, 25 CRIME & JUST. 291 (1999).

71 Surveying lawyers about their perceptions of other lawyers may be more accurate than selfperception. Schneider, supra note 56, at 150 ("[P]erceptions of one lawyer by another lawyer are
clearly more accurate than self-evaluations and are considered valuable given the similar
education and practice area." (citing KELLY G. SHAVER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ATTRIBUTION

PROCESSES 21-34 (1975))). We might have asked prosecutors about defenders' bargaining
behavior (although prosecutors would not know much if anything about defender preparation
behaviors), and while that is a strong candidate for future surveys, this study focused on the group
to which we had broad access: defenders. Nevertheless, phrasing the questions in terms of selfperception also allows us to compare our results more easily with the responses obtained from
past survey questions. See Uphoff & Wood, supra note 53.
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the attorneys speak about what should matter in negotiation, as opposed
to the actual practices that they claim to follow.
IV.

DEFENDERS' IMPLICIT THEORIES ABOUT PLEA BARGAINING

Our survey questions asked about the "importance" of various
factors to the outcome of negotiations and to preparation for
bargaining. Hence, the attorney responses to these questions make it
possible to identify their aspirations for the bargaining process-the
actions they believe they should take and the external conditions they
hope to find or create for their clients. Their ratings of the importance
of different factors amount to an implicit theory of negotiation based
on field experience. In this Part, we compare two of these implicit
theories of negotiation; each account offers a simplified narrative to
explain how one might understand a complex practice.
The first take on what matters in bargaining comes from
negotiation theory, which scholars and practitioners developed in civil
cases and later applied to the criminal context. Negotiation theory
highlights two principles as central to bargaining. The first principle is
that parties bargain in the shadow of trial, meaning that the predicted
outcomes at trial, and at sentencing after trial, form the baseline for
negotiations.72 A second theoretical principle, much studied in the civil
negotiation context, is that the negotiators' personal styles, as well as
their reputations as trial attorneys and as negotiators, play a significant
73
role in the actual bargaining process.
A second theory of negotiation is also visible in the survey data,
one that we call "bargaining in the shadow of the client." This strategy
emphasizes the individual qualities of the client, such as the importance
of collateral consequences for some defendants. Attorneys treat a wider
range of factors as important to negotiation outcomes, including
equities that reveal the client's relative lack of blameworthiness, rather
than a central focus on legally sufficient proof of crime elements.74
Defender responses to two categories of survey questions capture
the choice between these two theories of negotiation. First, in the
"Negotiation Practices" section of the survey, we asked defenders to
score the importance of twenty-four factors to the outcome of a

72 While important work has expanded that baseline to account for structural distortions and
psychological biases, the shadow of trial dynamic still looms large in theoretical accounts of
negotiation. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text (discussing literature).
73 See infra Section IV.D.
74 See Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable Decision Not to
Prosecute, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1655 (2010).
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negotiation on a scale of one to five ("not important at all" to "extremely
important"). The attorneys who place the highest priorities on several

trial-centered factors-such as "likely outcome after trial" and the
"likely sentence"-signal their belief in the "shadow of the trial" theory.
Second, the "Preparation for Bargaining" section of the survey
asked defenders to rate seven preparatory activities for their importance

to effective bargaining. The attorneys who assigned higher importance
to predictions of trial outcomes and sentences point once again to the
traditional "shadow of the trial" theory. Tables 1 and 2 list the average
scores for these two foundational questions.
Table 1: Ranking of Factors Important to Negotiation Outcomes
How important to the outcome of a negotiation are each of
the following factors when you are discussing potential

Average
Score

dispositions with a prosecutor?
Your client's criminal history
Your knowledge of the relevant facts
What your client wants and needs

4.63
4.48
4.43

Category/type of case (e.g., drugs, property, robbery)
Your knowledge of the relevant legal issues

4.34

Whether client is currently in custody
Sentencing range under state law
Probability of conviction after trial
Your knowledge of alternatives to incarceration
Prosecutor's personality
What the judge is likely to do at sentencing

4.18
4.15
3.90
3.89
3.88
3.88
3.87

Application of prosecutor office policy

3.81

Strength or weakness of any suppression issues
Your relationship with the prosecutor
Relevant collateral consequences
Your personality
Your reputation as a trial attorney
Victim's wishes
Your reputation as a negotiator
Number of cases on the prosecutor's docket

3.81
3.78
3.74
3.62
3.61
3.41
3.35
3.08

Law enforcement witness's wishes

2.85

Prosecutor's reputation as a negotiator
Prosecutor's reputation as a trial attorney
Number of cases you are defending
Scale: 1 = not important at all, 2 = relatively unimportant, 3 =
important, 4 = relatively important, 5 = extremely important

2.70
2.63
2.01
moderately
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Table 2: Importance of Preparation Activities

Rate the relative importance of the following
preparatory activities before negotiating, in order to be
effective during negotiations.

Average
Score

Having a clear sense of the client's goals

4.76

Getting timely receipt of discovery (before bargaining)

4.71

Investigating the facts of the case
Researching the legal issues in the case
Ability to predict outcome of sentencing phase of trial
Ability to predict outcome of guilt phase of trial
Developing a theory of the case (or theory of the
defense)

4.55
4.41
4.34
4.33
4.13

Scale: 1 = not important at all, 2 = relatively unimportant, 3 = moderately
important, 4 = relatively important, 5 = extremely important

In the remainder of this Part, we explore the differences among the
defense attorneys who tend to favor each of these two implicit
negotiation theories.

A.

The Two Shadows

A trial throws its shadow based largely on external factors that
require a somewhat objective evaluation from both sides in a
negotiation. Even if one negotiator does not agree with the other side's
predictions, there are common data points to discuss, such as the
governing law on confessions or the aspects of the defendant's past that
the jury is likely to hear.
But a lot of bargaining appears to happen in an entirely different
shadow, one cast by the defendant's life situation. These factors enter
the negotiation early, when the defense attorney presents the mitigating
context for the crime as charged. When defenders work to secure
dismissal, diversion, or a plea offer based on their clients' family,
employment, health, or other personal circumstances, the negotiation
occurs in the shadow of those factors and not just the likely outcome at
75
trial or the relevant legal factors that structure the sentence. These
factors, even if they would not be admissible at trial or central at
sentencing, are important considerations for a prosecutor who wants to

75 See id. (describing equitable factors distinct from legal guilt that should lead to a decision
not to charge).
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do justice.76 Unlike trial predictions and some sentence predictions,

these client-specific factors tend to be internally focused and subjective.
Personalizing one's client has long been considered valuable in a
negotiation. Client-centered approaches to lawyering focus on
individual autonomy and empowering clients to make decisions for

themselves.77 This conception of the attorney's role offers an alternative
to the traditional model, where lawyers take a client's basic goals into
account but use their own professional judgment to explore options and
then present a recommendation to the client.78
Our survey asked two questions directly related to the shadow of
the client perspective:
(1) How important to a negotiation outcome is "what your client
wants and needs"?
(2) How do you rate the relative importance of "having a clear sense
of your client's goals" as a preparatory activity before negotiating, to
be effective at bargaining?
At first glance, the answers to these questions do not meaningfully
distinguish defense attorneys from one another. Both got high rankings
from all subtypes of attorneys, cutting across gender, race, experience

level, and type of caseload.79

76 See FREDERICK & STEMEN, supra note 35 (describing viability of evidence and broader
justice concerns as independent influences on prosecutor decisions).
77 Although various accounts of the client-centered model differ somewhat in their
approaches and terminology, they all have client decision-making at their core. See Robert D.
Dinerstein, Client-CenteredCounseling: Reappraisaland Refinement, 32 ARIZ. L. REV. 501 (1990).
78 Id. at 504. The last forty years has seen the development of theoretical and empirical
support for this method of lawyering. For influential and early theoretical and practice-oriented
accounts, see DAVID A. BINDER & SUSAN C. PRICE, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING: A

CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH (1977); Stephen Ellmann, Lawyers and Clients, 34 UCLA L. REV.
717 (1987); Mark Spiegel, Lawyering and Client Decisionmaking:Informed Consent and the Legal
Profession, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 41 (1979). For an empirical account, see Uphoff & Wood, supra
note 53. In criminal defense, the term "holistic lawyering" describes a related approach that puts
the client's goals and autonomy front and center. Here, the defender interviews and counsels the
client to understand the full scope of problems that need attention, rather than limiting
representation to the narrow scope of the immediate criminal case (recognizing that the broader
approach might touch on issues that are directly or indirectly connected to involvement in the
criminal justice system). See Holistic Defense, Defined, BRONX DEFS., https://
www.bronxdefenders.org/holistic-defense
[https://perma.cc/VQ9X-D43V]
(describing the
"team's culture of open, frequent, and meaningful communication" and a "committed public
defender with an enhanced set of skills that are both client-centered and interdisciplinary"); see
also Michael Pinard, Broadening the HolisticMindset: IncorporatingCollateralConsequences and
Reentry into Criminal Defense Lawyering, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1067, 1071-73 (2004).
79 As Tables 1 and 2 indicate, the average score for the first question was 4.43 and the average
score for the second question was 4.76.
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After a closer look, however, there are some background
experiences that distinguish the attorneys who rated the client's goals
most highly as a focal point for their preparation for bargaining. Take
collateral consequences, for instance. Collateral consequences are "the
range of legal penalties and disabilities that flow from a criminal
conviction over and above the sentence imposed by the court."80 These
matters are irrelevant at trial and are too often peripheral to a typical
sentencing hearing.
In our pre-survey interviews, attorneys described how they used
collateral consequences during a negotiation. For example, one
defender described a prosecutor's plea offer in a reckless driving case
that included suspension of the client's license. For the client, however,
it "was a nonnegotiable for him to have his license suspended." So, when
the defender responded to the offer, she explained to the prosecutor that
"'he needs to drive; he needs to drive to pick his daughter up.' So that's
a non-negotiable."81
In theory, we would expect defenders who adopt a shadow-ofclient approach to negotiation to assign a higher score to the
importance of "collateral consequences of a conviction for your client."
And indeed, attorneys handling misdemeanor caseloads82 did score the
importance of collateral consequences at 4.09, "relatively important."83
This result reinforces the special importance of client priorities for these
attorneys, since collateral consequences are comparatively more
important in misdemeanor cases, where they can easily be the most
severe consequences for some defendants, such as those who need to
keep their occupational licenses or driving privileges.84
But it is too simple to conclude that misdemeanor attorneys
embrace the shadow-of-the-client theory. While misdemeanor
attorneys do tend to value collateral consequences in bargaining, there
are also felony attorneys who emphasize collateral consequences.
According to our multivariate analysis of survey answers, the

s0 MARGARET COLGATE LOVE, JENNY ROBERTS, & WAYNE A. LOGAN, COLLATERAL
CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL CONVICTION: LAW, POLICY & PRACTICE § 1:8 (2018). They include
things like formal and informal barriers to housing and employment based on a criminal record.
81 Interview with Public Defender B [hereinafter Interview with B].
82 See supra text accompanying note 63 (explaining how we categorize attorneys as having a
particular type of caseload if that attorney reported spending more than half of their hours on
that type of case (misdemeanor, general felony, special felony, traffic, juvenile, and appeals being
the relevant case types)).
83 This compares to felony attorneys, who answered the question at a lower average of 3.61.
There were no significant differences in the attorney answers to these questions based on gender,
race, or years of experience as a defense attorney.
84 See Jenny Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter: Defining Effective Advocacy in the Lower
CriminalCourts, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 277, 288-89 (2011).

1318

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:4

importance of collateral consequences for negotiation outcomes has a

statistically significant and positive predictive effect on the role of client
goals during preparation for bargaining. This remains true even after

controlling for the type of caseload that the attorney handles.85 It is the
attorney's focus on collateral consequences, rather than a misdemeanor

caseload as such, that makes a difference.
Some attorneys also placed high importance on the fact that their
clients remain in custody during negotiations. This suggests to us that
plea bargains are driven by factors that are not directly connected to
strength of evidence, and therefore would be more important for the
shadow-of-the-client theory.86 As we expected, attorneys who placed
heavy weight on the client's custody during negotiations were more
likely to score higher on shadow-of-client indicators, such as the
importance of the "client's goals."87 The custodial status of the
defenders' clients remained important even after controlling for other

characteristics of the attorneys' caseloads, courthouse environments,
and personal backgrounds.88
B.

Attorneys Who Emphasize FactorsMost Relevant to Trial

Under the shadow-of-trial theory, the parties predict trial
outcomes in large part by estimating the strength of the likely evidence
at trial and then multiplying that probability by the likely sentence after

85 See Appendix, Model 1C. The misdemeanor caseload of the attorney does not have a
statistically significant effect on the attorney's views about client wishes, after controlling for
other characteristics of the attorney's identity, experience, and courthouse environment.
86 While it is true that strength of evidence or likelihood of conviction are often statutory
factors for bail determinations, the judge setting bail makes that determination-part of a multifactor analysis intended to ensure a return to court-in a matter of minutes at the bail hearing.
See Russell M. Gold, Jail as Injunction, 107 GEO. L.J. 501 (2019). It is unlikely that the bargaining
parties use custodial status as a proxy for likelihood of conviction, as they are fully aware of the
limited nature of the bail inquiry. Indeed, criminal history and record of appearing (or failing to
appear) in court are also factors common to many bail statutes and, given the rapid nature of the
process and paucity of factual information at this early stage, are likely to weigh much more
heavily in the judge's determination.
87 See Appendix, Model 1C. This finding is consistent with a study of Florida lower criminal
courts, finding custodial status to be "[t]he most significant predictor of defendants entering a
plea of guilty or no contest at arraignment." ALISA SMITH & SEAN MADDAN, NAT'L ASS'N OF
CRIM. DEF. LAWS., THREE-MINUTE JUSTICE: HASTE AND WASTE IN FLORIDA'S MISDEMEANOR

COURTS 15, 26 tbl. 24 (2011).
88 The defense attorney's prior experience as a prosecutor also has a statistically significant
relationship to the attorney's high rating of client goals as a focal point for bargain preparation.
See Appendix, Models 1C, 2C. This could be because former prosecutors have seen for themselves
the impact of equitable factors and think about some defendants outside a trial-prediction
framework.
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trial.89 While the shadow-of-trial theory has been critiqued,90
"overwhelmingly, legal scholars view the shadow of trial as an accurate
description of the plea bargain decision-making process at the
individual case level."91
A corollary to the shadow-of-trial theory is a core teaching of
negotiation strategy, namely that the bargaining parties should be
aware-and bargain against the backdrop-of the "Best Alternative to
a Negotiated Agreement" (BATNA).92 In criminal cases, where
alternatives to a negotiated plea agreement are limited, determining the
BATNA requires a calculation of the likelihood of conviction and the
likely sentence after a conviction. While there are certainly other
components to a BATNA,93 the shadow of a trial looms large in this core
negotiation strategy as it applies in criminal cases.
If it were true that attorneys in a plea negotiation generally bargain
with the shadow of trial foremost in their minds, we would expect two
factors in particular to rank near the top of the importance-tonegotiation-outcome scale: "probability of conviction on all charges if
case were to go to trial" and "what the judge is likely to do at sentencing
in cases like this." These two factors, however, rate as more important
for some attorneys than for others.

&

89 The theory, properly applied, also requires an adjustment for the level of risk aversion for
both parties. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J. LEGAL
STUD. 289, 309-17 (1983) (applying shadow-of-trial model to criminal cases); Mnookin
Kornhauser, supra note 11, at 968-69; Bibas, supra note 7, at 2464 n.1, 2465 n.2 (citing scholars
who adopt a shadow-of-trial theory for both criminal and civil negotiation); Landes, supra note
54, at 66-69.
90 See, e.g., Bibas, supra note 7; Josh Bowers, Plea Bargaining'sBaselines, 57 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1083, 1102-03 (2016) (arguing that recent Supreme Court cases on plea bargaining "reset
the predictive baseline" and "rejected any notion that the post-trial sentence is the expected
punishment. To the contrary, the Court recognized that the plea negotiation is 'the critical point'
in almost all criminal cases." (footnote omitted)); Shawn D. Bushway & Allison D. Redlich, Is
Plea Bargainingin the "Shadow of the Trial"a Mirage?, 28 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 437,
450-51 (2012); Lauren Clatch, Note, Shining a Light on the Shadow-of-Trial Model: A Bridge
Between Discountingand Plea Bargaining, 102 MINN. L. REV. 923, 952, 965 (2017) (arguing that
although there is theoretical support for the shadow-of-trial theory, new practical studies
analyzing discounting along with the shadow-of-trial theory provide evidence about whether the
shadow at trial is too narrowly focused on sentencing outcomes, and whether the criminal justice
structure emphasizes certain outcomes).
91 Bushway & Redlich, supra note 90, at 438; see also Richard Birke, The Role of Trial in
Promoting Cooperative Negotiation in Criminal Practice, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 39, 67 (2007)
("Lawyers may bargain outside the shadow of expected value, but they do not bargain outside the
shadow of trial.").
92 See ROGER FISHER, WILLIAM URY, & BRUCE PATTON, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING
AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN 102 (3d ed. 2011).

93 See Roberts & Wright, supra note 9, at 1479-82 (discussing different ways to expand upon
the BATNA in a criminal case to widen the bargaining range).
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In particular, the number of years of experience matters for
attorney ratings of these two shadow-of-trial factors. As Table 3
indicates, attorneys with eight or more years of experience answered
these two questions more consistently with a shadow-of-trial theory,
while attorneys with fewer years of experience (even those with enough

years to handle felony cases) answered more in keeping with a shadowof-client theory.94 Years of experience remains a significant factor even
after controlling for other variables, such as felony caseloads and the

number of bench trials or jury trials that the attorney has litigated.95
Table 3: Average Scores for Importance of Probability of Conviction or
Likely Sentence, by Years of Experience
How important to the outcome of a

0-7 years

8 or more years

negotiation is ...
the probability of conviction on all 3.73
4.01
charges if case were to go to trial
what the judge is likely to do at 3.76
3.96
sentencing in cases like this
Scale: I = not important at all, 2 = relatively unimportant, 3 = moderately
important, 4 = relatively important, 5 = extremely important

The strength of any "suppression issues" is another factor with a
persistent impact on trial outcomes but little relevance to
understanding the broader context of the defendant's life. In short, it is
another question that one would expect to receive the highest scores
from attorneys who most clearly embrace the shadow-of-trial theory.
Our multivariate analysis confirms this expectation. Attorneys who
emphasize the importance of "suppression" issues are statistically more

likely to treat the probable trial outcome as an important factor in their
preparation for bargaining. In short, they operate within the shadow of
the trial.96 Overall, the "shadow of the trial" theory of negotiation
matters more for the most experienced attorneys, particularly those

94 For the difference between the two means on the importance of probability, the t-value =
-2.95672 and p = .001629; for the difference between average responses on the importance of
judicial sentencing behavior, t-value = -1.99259 and p = .023426.
95 See Appendix, Models 1A, 1B, 2A, 2B.
96 The same is true when the dependent variable is prediction of sentences. See Appendix,
Models 1A, 1B, 2A.
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who stress the importance of motions to suppress evidence (possibly
because their clients tend to present such issues more frequently).97
The defendant's criminal history, in theory, could relate to both the
shadow-of-trial and the shadow-of-client models of negotiation. A
defendant's prior convictions might not factor heavily into the
likelihood of a conviction at trial because most defendants do not testify
at trial and their priors are not usually in evidence.98 On the other hand,
criminal history could matter to attorney predictions of the sentence
(another indicator of a shadow-of-trial approach to negotiation)
because criminal history plays such a central role in sentencing law.
Over on the shadow-of-client side of the ledger, criminal history
could matter during negotiations, regardless of any effect on the trial
outcome or post-trial sentencing. It matters instead for the prosecutor's
willingness to drop below the market rate for the charged offense, taking
a chance on the defendant's future prospects. This factor shows how
disconnected plea bargaining can be from the guilt or innocence of the
defendant.99
Consistent with these expectations, our multivariate analyses show
that criminal history matters both to shadow-of-trial preparation and to
shadow-of-client preparations for negotiation. Attorneys who placed
the most importance on criminal history were statistically more likely
(after controlling for other variables) to stress trial predictions and
97 Male defense attorneys were less likely than female attorneys to treat trial prediction as a
focal point for bargaining preparation; this finding was statistically significant, but barely so, at
p = 0.048. See Appendix, Model IA.
98 See Jeffrey Bellin, The Silence Penalty, 103 IOWA L. REV. 395, 417 (2018) (According to data
collected for felony cases in Los Angeles, the District of Columbia, the Bronx, and Phoenix from
2000-2001, only 330 defendants went to trial in all four of those jurisdictions during that time
period and only about half testified at trial.). There is a well-developed body of data around the
role of impeachment in exonerations. See John H. Blume, The Dilemma of the Criminal
Defendant with a PriorRecord-Lessons from the Wrongfully Convicted, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 477, 492, 498 (2008) (suggesting that impeachment with prior criminal history contributes
to wrongful convictions and noting that "[iun every single instance where an innocent defendant
with a prior conviction for an impeachable offense elected to testify, the court permitted the
prosecution to impeach the defendant").
99 The high rating of criminal history is consistent with theories of plea bargaining that are
more cynical than the shadow of trial-which is tied to questions of guilt or innocence and
proportional punishment. Those alternatives include a theory of managerial justice, advanced
largely in connection with misdemeanor courts, which "sort defendants based largely upon
records of prior encounters" rather than their factual guilt or blameworthiness in the crime as
charged. Issa Kohler-Hausmann, ManagerialJustice and Mass Misdemeanors, 66 STAN. L. REV.
611, 617-18 (2014); see also STEPHANOS BIBAS, THE MACHINERY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 30-34

(2012). Another theory accepts the shadow of trial as one factor relevant to negotiation outcomes
while recognizing that systemic factors such as unfair bail practices, as well as subconscious biases
and heuristics, are significant drivers of the plea bargaining process. Bibas, supra note 7; Russell
Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Heuristics and Biases at the BargainingTable, 87 MARQ. L. REV. 795
(2004).
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sentence predictions as part of their preparation for bargaining, two
indicators of a shadow-of-trial orientation.100 At the same time,
attorneys who placed the greatest importance on criminal history were
also more likely to emphasize gaining knowledge of alternatives to

incarceration, an indicator of a shadow-of-client mindset.101
C.

Attorneys Who De-Emphasize the Role of Caseloads in
Negotiation

Defenders in our survey report that their caseloads at the time of a
negotiation are relatively unimportant to the outcome of that
negotiation. This is perhaps our most surprising result, given the

common wisdom that high volume is a primary driver of our bargainbased system of criminal justice. The response
uncertainties involved in self-reported survey data.

highlights the

Table 4: Importance of "number of cases you are defending at the same
time as this case," by type of caseload

1 = Not Important
2 = Relatively Unimportant
3 = Moderately Important

4 = Relatively Important
5 = Extremely Important
Total
Average Score

Misdemeanor

Felony

Attorneys

Attorneys

37
39

110

13
7
8

104
2.13

108
21

4
16
259
1.87

As Table 4 indicates, misdemeanor attorneys averaged 2.13
("relatively unimportant"), whereas felony attorneys placed even less
importance on the factor, at 1.87.102 Defenders rated their own caseload

See Appendix, Models 1A, 1B.
101 See Appendix, Model 1D. Criminal history is not a significant influence on the score for
client goals as a dependent variable. Id., Model 1C.
102 Given the generally higher caseloads of misdemeanor attorneys and lower caseloads of
attorneys handling felony cases, this difference is predictable. For the difference between the
means produced by misdemeanor and felony attorneys, the t-value = 2.05644 and p = .020229.
We also asked defenders to rank the "number of cases on the prosecutor's docket along with this
case" for its importance to the outcome of a particular negotiation. While the rankings here were
higher than those for the defender's own caseload, they were still surprisingly low. Defenders
gave this factor an average score of 3.08, making it only "moderately important" to negotiation
outcomes.
100
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dead last on the list of twenty-four factors for importance to negotiation
outcomes.10 3
Defenders' beliefs about the unimportance of their own caseloads
stand in contrast to other evidence about the pressures of caseloads.
There are many studies and news reports highlighting public defense
sometimes
and
unethically,
under
operate
that
systems
unconstitutionally, high workloads. 104 For instance, one Georgia court,
in ruling that a defendant could withdraw his guilty plea due to
ineffective assistance of counsel, described how the defense lawyer
claimed that "he had so many cases on his load, that if he looked into
every nook and cranny that there was to this case, that he would never
get anything done."105 In that case, the investigation that the lawyer
skipped because of lack of time was the defendant's claim that he was
not actually driving the truck involved in the accident! 106
Other more systematic studies of negotiation practices explore the
specific link between high caseloads and plea bargaining. For example,
an important study of attorney negotiation styles offered high attorney
docket loads as one explanation for the unexpected finding: criminal
law practitioners reported higher levels of problem-solving (versus
107
adversarial) negotiation than lawyers practicing in other areas.
Another scholar described high caseloads and limited resources as
conditions that "create a perfect storm that encourages high plea rates,
discourages negotiation, and contributes to many defendants feeling
that they are simply getting processed through the system, but are not
receiving individualized attention or justice."108

103 Our multivariate analysis shows that the caseloads of prosecutors had no significant effect
on the attorneys' willingness to endorse shadow-of-trial or shadow-of-client indicators during
their preparation for bargaining. See Appendix, Models 1A, 1B, 1C, 1D.
104 See, e.g., POSTLETHWAITE & NETTERVILLE & A.B.A., THE LOUISIANA PROJECT: A STUDY OF
THE LOUISIANA DEFENDER SYSTEM AND ATTORNEY WORKLOAD STANDARDS 14, 21 (2017),

https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aidindigentdefendants/
ls_sclaid_louisianaprojectreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/4L2V-73AS] (using a "multi-round
survey process developed by the Rand Corporation and used in a range of industries and
professions" to determine that "the Louisiana public defense system currently only has capacity
to handle 21% of the workload in compliance with the Delphi Panel's consensus opinions");
Richard A. Oppel Jr. & Jugal K. Patel, One Lawyer, 194 Felony Cases, and No Time, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 31, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/01/31/us/public-defender-caseloads.html [https://perma.cc/57YL-8VD9].
105 Heath v. State, 601 S.E.2d 758, 759-60 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004).
106 Id. at 760.

107 See Schneider, supra note 56, at 157-58 ("Problem-solving behavior could also result from
the clear need to settle cases and move work along.").
108 Cynthia Alkon, The U.S. Supreme Court's Failure to Fix Plea Bargaining: The Impact of
Lafler and Frye, 41 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 561, 582 (2014).
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In light of these accounts, the survey responses surprised us. Two
potential explanations occur to us for this anomaly. First, it is possible
that defenders are simply fooling themselves about their ability to get

good negotiation outcomes despite the number of cases they handle.
Negotiation literature suggests that strong factual and legal preparation
enhances negotiation outcomes, 109 and this preparation takes time.
Time for preparation is precisely what an attorney with a high caseload
cannot give to each client.

There is a second potential explanation for the low level of
importance assigned to caseloads. The low rating of caseload might
align with a narrative that treats plea bargaining as something distinct
from trial preparation and prediction. Attorneys might estimate that
preparation for trial takes longer than preparation for negotiation. If

that is true, bargaining in the shadow of the client offers a second-best
way to deal with their time crunch. By remaining alert to negotiation
factors that matter outside the context of a time-intensive trial, an
attorney invests in a strategy that will produce the best available
outcome for the client, given that the attorney rarely has time for trial
preparation.110
That being said, we still treat this second explanation as selfdelusional. Defenders who downplay the effects of caseload fail to see
that preparation for negotiation in the shadow of the client involves the
investigation of a broader range of factors, and therefore can take more
time than preparation for bargaining in the shadow of trial predictions.
D.

Attorneys De-Emphasize PersonalStyles and Reputations

Negotiation scholars treat "personal style or strategy or
personality" as part of the "common core of negotiation" theory.", The

109 See Katie Shonk, Negotiation PreparationStrategies, HARV. L. SCH. PROGRAM ON NEGOT.:
DAILY BLOG (Mar. 25, 2021), https://www.pon.harvard.edu/daily/business-negotiations/
negotiation-preparation-strategies [https://perma.cc/TLw6-448P].
110 It is also possible that defenders we surveyed who practice in offices that do not have
particularly high caseloads are those reporting the lowest levels of importance. As we do not have
data on the caseloads of every office, let alone every attorney, that we surveyed, this is a hypothesis
that we only flag but cannot at this time analyze.
111 Christopher Honeyman & Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Catching Up with the Major-General:
The Need for a "Canon of Negotiation", 87 MARQ. L. REV. 637, 638, 643-44 (2004) (noting how
this canon "include[s] the concepts of competitive or adversarial v. interest based or principled
or problem-solving"); see also Schneider, supra note 56, at 155 (discussing that criminal
lawyers-in particular public defenders-utilize the "true problem solving" approach more than
an adversarial, unethical or cautious style); Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Shattering Negotiation
Myths: EmpiricalEvidence on the Effectiveness of Negotiation Style, 7 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 143,
147-48 (2002) (finding that problem solving rather than adversarial styles are more effective).
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idea is that a negotiator's own personality and the interpersonal
dynamic between two negotiators have predictable effects on the
eventual agreement.11 2 And there is empirical confirmation to show
1 13
how rapport between negotiators might affect negotiation outcomes.
Our pre-survey interviews with public defenders were consistent
with the negotiation literature theme that prosecutors' and defenders'
personal styles and personalities-and the way in which those personal
styles and personalities meshed or clashed-were an important aspect
of the actual negotiation dynamic and outcome. As one defender from
a mid-sized office in the Mid-Atlantic region put it, the "personality of
the individual" is important because "there are prosecutors I know I
would get a better deal with because of my relationship with them. And
there are prosecutors I know I would get a very bad offer because of my
relationship with them." This defender continued, explaining how,
"when it comes down to negotiation and plea, [it] really is about the
individuals. . . your client, the attorney, and the prosecutor."114
Similar to personality and personal style, attorney reputation is
understood to play an important role in negotiations. In her study
demonstrating that defenders and prosecutors reported much higher
levels of cooperation (or problem-solving) in their negotiation practices
than civil, family, or commercial law attorneys, Andrea Kupfer
Schneider offered the "reputation market[]" theory as one potential
112 For example, one negotiation scholar described how "[n]egotiators have the power to
construct their identities in ways that improve their negotiation process and outcome. To this
end, self-awareness is essential, followed by conscious decisions about how to act in ways that
lead to more satisfying outcomes." Daniel L. Shapiro, Identity Is More than Meets the "I": The
Power of Identity in Shaping Negotiation Behavior, 87 MARQ. L. REV. 809, 816 (2004); cf. Robert
C. Bordone, Teaching InterpersonalSkills for Negotiation and for Life, 16 NEGOT. J. 377, 382
(2000). At a more granular level, a meta-analytic study supports a finding that a positive
interaction is created by nonverbal cues such as "smiling, head nodding, forward lean, and direct
body orientation" as opposed to imitating body posture. Linda Tickle-Degnen & Robert
Rosenthal, The Nature of Rapport and Its Nonverbal Correlates, 1 PSYCH. INQUIRY 285, 291
(1990).
113 See, e.g., Jason Scott Johnston & Joel Waldfogel, Does Repeat Play Elicit Cooperation?
Evidencefrom Federal Civil Litigation, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 39, 59 (2002) (examining thousands of
civil cases and finding that when opposing counsel frequently litigated against each other, cases
were resolved more quickly and were less likely to go to trial than where attorneys lacked previous
interaction); Janice Nadler, Rapport in Negotiation and Conflict Resolution, 87 MARQ. L. REV.
875, 877 (2004) ("There is now considerable empirical evidence suggesting that the development
of rapport fosters cooperative behavior necessary for efficient negotiated outcomes in mixedmotive conflicts.").
114 Interview with Public Defender C [hereinafter Interview with C]. Another defender
expressed a similar thought, noting how negotiation "is more about style." Interview with Public
Defender D. A defender explained how negotiating styles can shift depending on the opposing
party, stating that "you ... find your own style and your own way of negotiating because ... it's
something that depends on ... who is the state attorney." Interview with Public Defender E
[hereinafter Interview with E].
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explanation for this surprising difference in levels."s Under this theory,
because "the geographic area of practice is narrow and the population
of prosecutors and criminal lawyers is also limited[,] ... the likelihood
of ongoing relationships, clear communication, and problem-solving
behavior could be understood to occur as a result of repeat play among
the lawyers."116
A criminal law practitioner's reputation as a trial lawyer holds a

status similar to his or her reputation as a negotiator. It is a strongly
held view among criminal law practitioners that a reputation as a skilled
trial attorney-and one who is not afraid to go to trial-is a valuable
chip in any plea bargaining session.117 Conversely, the clients of lawyers
with perceived poor trial skills or judgment about when to go to trial
may suffer the consequences of that reputation.118
Our interviews also confirmed these accounts. One defender noted
how the impact of reputation on a negotiation was "the biggest thing
that I never saw coming ... .I know I get deals from DAs that other

115 Schneider, supra note 56, at 156; see also Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing
Through Agents: Cooperationand Conflict Between Lawyers in Litigation,94 COLUM. L. REV. 509,
546 (1994) (theorizing a "reputation market" in the negotiation context, where a "pattern of
cooperation within the community is obviously crucial to the lawyer's professional survival"). In
Schneider's survey, criminal lawyers perceived problem-solving behavior as highly effective in
attorneys with whom they bargained. They also perceived typical aggressive bargaining traits of
being stubborn, arrogant, and egotistical as generally ineffective. In particular, and not
surprisingly, attorneys with a reputation for being unethical were seen as even less effective.
Schneider, supra note 56, at 148-49. Schneider's findings suggest that lawyers who display
problem-solving behavior in smaller markets are perceived as more effective, although problemsolving is still seen as quite effective in larger markets.
116 Schneider, supra note 56, at 157; see also GERALD R. WILLIAMS, LEGAL NEGOTIATION AND

SETTLEMENT 15-46 (1983); Catherine H. Tinsley, Kathleen M. O'Connor, & Brandon A. Sullivan,
Tough Guys Finish Last: The Perils of a Distributive Reputation, 88 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM.
DECISION PROCESSES 621, 637 (2002) (showing that having an uncooperative reputation hurts
even expert negotiators because, in response, others are reluctant to cooperate and share less
information); Birke, supra note 91, at 79 ("[C]riminal practice is cooperative because there is
frequent contact with the court and because trials occur frequently .... "); Johnston & Waldfogel,
supra note 113.
117 See Alkon, supra note 108, at 610 ("For defense lawyers, it may matter to not be seen as a
'dump truck'-a lawyer who is afraid of trial and pleads their clients guilty, regardless of whether
the deal is good or not.").
118 Birke, supra note 91, at 73 (discussing how "[t]here is certainly a reputation cost for being
known as someone who wastes a court's time" for attorneys who go to trial on cases that are
viewed as poor candidates for trial). Further, the ability to make credible threats (e.g., going to
trial) in a negotiation is considered to have an effect on outcome. Cf Alafair S. Burke,
ProsecutorialPassion, Cognitive Bias, and Plea Bargaining, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 183, 187 (2007)
(noting how one explanation for what types of plea bargains prosecutors offer is that "prosecutors
can reserve their easiest cases for trial to establish an impressive conviction record," although
expressing doubt that many prosecutors are motivated by this).
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lawyers don't because they trust me."119 Another defender stressed the
importance of a strong reputation as a trial attorney: "if you come back
with a counter offer and they're aware that you're willing to go to
trial .. . then I notice that we get a lot better offers from them."120 A
defender from a different office described how, during a negotiation "I
would like to think my dealings with the DA and my reputation for
trying a case, but also being easy to get along with, makes it easier to
talk about stuff."121
Our survey responses, however, do not match this narrative about
the importance of personal style, interpersonal relationships, and
reputation of the negotiators in the plea bargaining context. In our
survey question asking defenders to rate twenty-four factors for their
importance to the outcome of a negotiation,122 there were seven factors
related to personality and reputation. As Table 5 demonstrates,
defenders rated both parties' reputations as negotiators and as trial
lawyers near the bottom. The prosecutor's reputation for negotiation
and trial were the lowest, both falling between "relatively unimportant"
and "moderately important."123

119 Interview with Public Defender F (noting how "I made a joke to somebody. I said, 'I have
two avenues for plea bargaining. One is "please give me this deal; this is a really good client they
really deserve it. Please, please." And the other is "please, please this client is a huge pain, I don't
want to deal with him anymore and if you have any respect for me you will give me this plea.""").
120 Interview with B; see also Interview with E ("[S]ome attorneys here in district court are
very good at negotiating in terms of talking through the case and talking about the client.... I
think my negotiation is-I mean my better skill is to tell them I'm going to try the case until you
die in this courtroom. And I feel because the state attorneys don't want to do that, and then I tell
them about the client and then I try to have them be more reasonable, but I feel the-my strong
suit which is just tell them-my negotiation, I feel, is really being able to tell them that I would
try this case no matter.").
121 Interview with Public Defender G. That same attorney observed, however, that a
reputation as a "bad lawyer" who is "not going to try the case very well" might have the opposite
effect on the negotiation, because prosecutors "don't want that on their conscience that a person
got a ton of time because he had a terrible attorney."
122 See supra Table 1.
123 Defenders rated their own reputations (both as trial attorneys and as negotiators) as more
important than the reputations of prosecutors. We treat this as an artifact of self-reported survey
responses.
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Table 5: Importance of Personal Style, Reputation, and Relationships in

Negotiation
How important to the outcome of a negotiation
are each of the following factors when you are

discussing potential
prosecutor?

dispositions

with

Rank
of 24

Average
Score

10
14

3.88
3.78

a

Prosecutor's personality
Your relationship with prosecutor assigned to the
case

Your personality
16
Your reputation as a trial attorney
17
Your reputation as a negotiator
20
Prosecutor's reputation as a negotiator
22
Prosecutor's reputation as a trial attorney
23
Scale: 1 = not important at all, 2 = relatively unimportant, 3 =
important, 4 = relatively important, 5 = extremely important

3.62
3.61
3.35
2.70
2.63
moderately

All of these reputational and personality ratings were relatively
stable across all groups of attorneys. 124

In sum, defense attorneys responded skeptically when the survey
asked about the importance of the reputations of the bargainers or the
relationships between them. They believed instead that the fundamental
inputs to the negotiation were case and defendant characteristics, such
as the criminal record of the defendant or the client's wants and needs.
These fundamentals outshone their own typical choice of negotiating
styles or their track record of negotiating with the particular prosecutor.
At the same time, the perceived importance of the relationship
between the prosecutor and the defense attorney did have a statistically
significant effect on the attorneys' ratings of shadow-of-trial indicators.

More specifically, a respondent's rating of the importance of the
relationship between prosecutor and defense attorney to the outcome
of negotiations has a statistically significant positive impact on the
attorney's rating of the importance of trial outcome predictions to
preparation for bargaining.125 Even though the attorneys as a whole

124 Interestingly, there was no meaningful difference in the way that attorneys identifying as
female or male rated the importance of their reputation as trial attorneys. There was also no
difference in ratings of the importance of prosecutor or defense attorney reputations at trial
between defenders who believe that there is a large trial penalty and those who believe that there
is a small penalty or none at all.
125 See Appendix, Models 1A, 2A. The same is true for the importance of sentence predictions.
See id. Model 1B.
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rated this relationship factor as relatively unimportant, differences
within those low-level ratings show us that attorneys who place greater
weight on prosecutor relationships also believe that trial predictions
and sentence predictions should be central to their preparation for plea
bargaining.
V.

THE GAP BETWEEN IMPLICIT THEORY AND SELF-DECLARED

PRACTICE

This Part compares what defenders report as important during
negotiations in general to what they claim to do in their own cases. As
always, self-reports about job performance should prompt us to
interpret the survey answers cautiously. But to the extent that the
answers reveal an internal conflict between theory and practice, we
might reasonably conclude that the survey answers understate the size

of the gap.
Three sets of questions allow us to look at this gap. First, in the
"Negotiation Practices" section of the survey, we asked defenders to
score the importance of twenty-four factors to the outcome of a
negotiation; Table 1 describes their answers. Second, in the
"Preparation for Bargaining" section, the survey asked defenders to
rank seven preparatory activities for their importance to effective
bargaining (as summarized in Table 2). Third, the survey asked
attorneys to note the frequency with which they personally engaged in
nine activities as they prepared for negotiations in their own cases, from
"never" to "always." The full list of those preparation activities appears
in Table 6.
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Table 6: Frequency of Activities in Preparation for Negotiation
How often do you engage in the following activities as you
prepare for any bargaining session in a typical case?

Average

Ask client about possible pleas

4.69

Review file

4.69

Explore collateral consequences

3.99

Legal research

3.63

Interview defense witnesses

3.52

Discuss or moot with colleague or supervisor

3.12

Interview prosecution witnesses

3.01

Investigate scene of crime

2.80

Ask witnesses about possible pleas

2.50

Scale: 5 = Always, 4 = Usually, 3 = Sometimes, 2 = Infrequently, 1 = Never
Defense attorneys do link their ideas about negotiation outcomes
to their views about how best to prepare for bargaining. That linkage
reflects a consistent and coherent theory of negotiation on their part.
Thus, attorneys who stress shadow-of-trial factors as important to the
outcomes of negotiations also say that shadow-of-trial factors are
important to their preparation for bargaining.126 The same is true for
shadow-of-client factors: attorneys link their beliefs about outcomes to
their preparation.127
When we turn, however, to the self-reported practices of attorneys
during negotiation (as opposed to preparation before negotiation
begins), the relationship between attorney beliefs and their self-declared

practices becomes weaker. A theory-to-practice gap opens up.
For instance, one might associate a willingness to signal a vigorous

motions practice with the shadow-of-trial theory of negotiation,
because this practice stresses legal factors relevant at trial rather than
equitable factors related to the client's larger story. Yet this bargaining
practice happened (or reportedly happened) less often for attorneys
who otherwise seem committed to the shadow-of-trial theory. Strong
attorney views about the importance of trial predictions and sentence

126 See id. Models 2A, 2B. "Probability of conviction, importance to outcome" shows a
statistically significant and positive relationship to trial outcome prediction as an important
factor in preparation for bargaining. Likewise, rating sentence prediction as important to the
outcome is positively associated with sentence prediction as a preparatory activity.
127 See id. Models 2C, 2D (clear sense of client goals, knowledge of alternatives to prison).
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prediction to the outcomes of negotiations (two indicators of a shadowof-trial viewpoint) have a statistically significant negative impact on
scores for the self-reported frequency of signaling a vigorous motions
practice. The attorneys most committed to shadow-of-trial theory are
the least likely to say that they make a strong investment in pretrial

motions.128
More generally, our multivariate analyses point to a separation
between beliefs about effective negotiation and attorney claims about
negotiation behavior. The analyses offer no clear example that attorney
beliefs about factors that should matter during negotiation (their
implicit theories of negotiation) do indeed have a predictable impact on
the practices that attorneys claim to follow during negotiations.129
In an effort to map the precise location of these gaps between
theory and practice, we explore in the following subsections the insights
one might draw from several pairs of questions. Each pair exposes the
gap between what attorneys declared to be important and what they
described as their actual practices. Attorneys appear to be missing
opportunities in factual investigation, legal research, and the timing of
bargaining moves.
A.

LearningAbout Relevant Facts

Negotiation literature teaches that knowledge is power. 130 In plea
bargaining, prosecutors are generally thought to hold more power than
defense counsel and defendants.131 But solid preparation-knowing the
128 See id. Model 3B. Similarly, the importance of predicting the sentence as part of
preparation for negotiation (a shadow-of-trial indicator) has a statistically significant negative
impact on the attorney's willingness to bluff during negotiations about potential defenses to be
raised at trial, which we treat as a shadow-of-trial factor. See id. Model 3C.
129 In Models 3A through 3D, the independent variables from Group D (beliefs about
negotiation) only have a statistically significant effect on specified negotiation practices (the
dependent variable) in the two instances described supra, note 128. Those two examples point in
the opposite direction that the attorneys' theories of prosecution would suggest. The one arguable
exception to this observation involves attorneys who stressed the importance of the client's goals
as part of preparationfor bargaining. Those same attorneys said, as expected, that they negotiate
more often than other attorneys about collateral consequences for their clients, which is
consistent with a shadow-of-the-client theory of negotiation. See Appendix, Model 3A.
130 See, e.g., DAVID V. LEWIS, POWER NEGOTIATING TACTICS & TECHNIQUES (1981); Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem Solving,
31 UCLA L. REV. 754, 834 (1984).
131 See Daniel D. Barnhizer, BargainingPower in the Shadow of the Law: Commentary to
Professors Wright and Engen, Professor Birke, and Josh Bowers, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 123 (2007)
(comparing power imbalance between defenders and prosecutors to power imbalance between
producers and consumers and noting that defendants have limited options in plea bargaining);
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law and the facts-is one way to counteract that power imbalance in a

negotiation.132
For defense counsel in a criminal case, this means gaining

knowledge of the facts of the case through investigation. For example,
in one study from 1981, defense attorneys reported an improved
position during plea negotiations when they "interviewed prosecution
witnesses and conducted extensive fact investigations."133 Getting
information from the prosecution during the actual negotiation process
is also an important tool.
Our interviews showed that defenders understood the importance

of gathering facts from the very first client contact. For example, one
attorney described how "at no point do you really start negotiations
without having talked to your client, having at least. . . your client's
story so that even when you start the negotiation-if you only start with
the same facts the state has you pretty much lock yourself into whatever
version they come up with."134
In their survey responses, defenders also recognize the power of
early factual investigation. As noted in Table 1, defense attorneys report
that their knowledge of the relevant facts of a case is between "relatively"
and "extremely important" to the outcome of a negotiation, with an
average score of 4.48.135
Yet when it comes to their reports of actualpreparation related to

knowledge of the facts, defenders' responses are mixed. Defenders
report that they review the file nearly "always" as they prepare for a
negotiation (4.69 on the frequency scale). However, several other
preparatory activities related to fact investigation happen less
frequently. Interviewing defense witnesses only happens midway

between "sometimes" and "usually" (3.5) and interviewing prosecution
witnesses occurs even less often, at "sometimes" (3.0).
As defense attorneys gain more experience or handle more serious
cases, they become more likely to investigate facts more thoroughly. For
example, attorneys with less than 7.5 years of experience reported
interviewing defense witnesses before negotiations only slightly more

Donald G. Gifford, A Context-Based Theory of Strategy Selection in Legal Negotiation, 46 OHIO
STATE L.J. 41, 76 (1985) ("In most cases, the prosecutor possesses much greater power in plea
bargaining than does the defense attorney.").
132 See Doyel, supra note 43, at 1025-27; Honeyman & Schneider, supra note 111, at 643-44.
133 Lieberman, supra note 42, at 572. In particular, defenders who interviewed victims
reported having "a better chance of obtaining charge reduction as part of the plea agreement than
defense lawyers who do not interview victims." Id. at 574.
134 Interview with C.
135 Consistent with this, and as noted in Table 2, defenders scored preparation by investigating
the facts of the case at 4.55 on the importance scale.
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than "sometimes" (3.34), whereas more experienced attorneys
produced a higher average (3.66).136
The general trend up with experience could be a "best practice"
story: defenders learn through practice how important it is to interview
witnesses. A defender who can interview a prosecution witness might
offer favorable or relevant information about a client that will influence
that witness's wishes. Further, a witness who is reluctant to come to
court, or who does not want to see the defendant incarcerated, can
influence a prosecutor's assessment of the strength of a case at trial.
Alternatively, the explanation for an increased use of witness
interviews over time might be based more on the type of case than on
experience levels. Inexperienced attorneys are more likely to handle
cases where the only defense witness is the defendant.
High caseloads allow less time to investigate the facts, which could
explain the differences between misdemeanor attorneys and felony
attorneys in their interview practices.137 So could the fact that in many
jurisdictions, misdemeanor attorneys meet their clients for the first time
on the day when or shortly before the case is resolved, leaving little time
for any type of investigation. The culture of misdemeanor practice is
surely another factor here, with pressure to dispose of misdemeanor
cases quickly, particularly in high-volume jurisdictions.
Another preparatory activity relating to factual development,
investigating the scene of the crime, was near the bottom of the list,
coming in at 2.8 on the frequency scale (below "sometimes"). The rating
does grow stronger, however, as attorneys gain more years of experience
38
and move from misdemeanor to felony cases.1
Again, there are a number of possible explanations here. Going to
the crime scene is not always relevant to a case, although it is often
undervalued as an investigatory tool. Also, public defenders could not
possibly visit the scene for every case, and so some triage must
happen-crime scene investigation may thus occur as cases get closer
to trial, for those very few cases that arrive at that point. The attorney

136 For the less experienced group, n = 205; for the more experienced group, n = 274. The
difference between the two means is statistically significant, with t-value = -5.20435 and p <.0001.
On the other hand, there is no meaningful difference based on experience when it comes to
interviews of prosecutionwitnesses.
137 The average for misdemeanor attorneys (n = 102) is 3.38 for interviews of defense
witnesses; the average for felony attorneys (n = 254) is 3.59. For the difference between these
means, the t-value = -2.02671 and p = .021721.
138 Misdemeanor attorneys score this at 2.47 on the frequency scale, general felony defenders
at 2.91, and special felony defenders at 3.46. The difference between misdemeanor and felony
attorneys was significant, with a t-value of -4.96905 and p < .00001. Attorneys with 0-1.4 years
of experience score crime scene investigation at 2.18 in frequency, compared to 3.27 for attorneys
with more than 30.5 years of experience.
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responses to questions about fact development conflict with their
dubious claim that caseloads
success.139

are not important to negotiation

Another key component of fact investigation is the discovery
process. Defenders can potentially get witness statements, exculpatory
evidence, physical evidence, and other facets of the prosecution's likely
case-in-chief through discovery. Defenders recognize the importance of

this process, rating "timely receipt of discovery" close to "extremely
important" (average 4.76). Surprisingly, defenders also reported
"usually" receiving discovery before the start of negotiations (4.0
average). 140
At the same time, defense attorneys do not engage very often in
strategic information exchange during the bargaining process.
Defenders can be careful about what information they share during
bargaining, providing nothing more than the law requires them to
disclose. They can also directly request, or indirectly work to obtain or
develop, information from the prosecution during plea bargaining that
reaches more broadly than discovery laws indicate.141
Our survey responses suggest that this type of strategic
information exchange is not happening, and this represents a missed
opportunity for better negotiation outcomes in some classes of cases.
Defenders report that they often fail to gain new information during the
plea bargaining process. Further, they report giving prosecutors as
much or more information than they gain during a typical

negotiation.142
When broken down by level of cases they handle, attorneys
defending misdemeanor cases have a lower frequency score for learning
new information apart from discovery (2.82, compared to 3.16 for

139 See supra Section IV.C.
140 There was no significant difference between felony and misdemeanor attorneys in the
responses. Of course, simple review of discovery from the prosecution is no substitute for a
defender's independent fact investigation. For example, one survey asked criminal defense
attorneys about "their most recent felony cases that went to trial" and revealed that in threefourths of those trials, the defenders found the prosecution's evidence weaker than the evidence
in the police reports disclosed during discovery. Lieberman, supra note 42, at 571-72.
141 See Roberts & Wright, supra note 9, at 1487-88. One major treatise on plea bargaining
encourages practitioners to prepare specific lists for information they need to get, information
they plan to reveal, and information they plan to protect during the negotiation. G. NICHOLAS
HERMAN, PLEA BARGAINING 59, 95-96 (3d ed. 2012).
142 Attorneys reported that they sometimes (2.98 average) withheld from the prosecution
information favorable to the defense, to preserve an advantage at trial. They also said that they
"fail to mention" information unfavorable to the defense, at a frequency between "sometimes"
and "usually" (3.56 average). They "bluff' about likely defenses at trial only "rarely" (2.26).
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felony attorneys).143 On the other hand, attorneys handling every type
of caseload reported the same level of sharing their information with
the prosecutor during negotiations.
To be sure, there may be good reason for defenders to share
information with the prosecution during a bargaining session. This may
be the only time for defenders to tell prosecutors about their clients'
personal circumstances. If that is the attorney's motive for sharing the
client's information with the prosecution, it would be consistent with a
shadow-of-client negotiation theory that stresses equitable factors
rather than predictions of strictly legal outcomes. Our multivariate
analyses, however, do not confirm this connection. Attorneys who
adopt a shadow-of-client theory do not say that they share information
with the prosecutor more frequently than other defense attorneys do. 144
The survey responses also reveal that defenders make offers that
they say are generally unfavorable to their own clients.145 Thus, the
strategic information imbalance may bode poorly overall for
defendants. Instead, spur-of-the-moment negotiating (perhaps with no
preparation) could explain why defenders share more information than
they gain during bargaining.
B.

LearningAbout Relevant Law

Gaining knowledge of the relevant law, in light of the facts of the
case, is also central to the preparation process. Negotiation literature
explores how a firm grasp of the relevant legal standards can give a party
power by allowing them to hold opposing counsel to objective criteria
about sentencing and fairness generally.146 For example, in one of our
interviews, a defender described the importance of understanding
sentencing guidelines: when "you already have a full concept of what
your guidelines are going to be, if the state doesn't have that full
concept, clearly you've got an advantage."147
In rating the importance of their own knowledge of the relevant
legal issues to the outcomes in negotiation, defenders' average score was
4.18, "relatively important." This aligns with the average score

143 The difference between misdemeanor and felony attorneys is significant, with a t-value of
-3.35636 and p = .000437. The lower score for misdemeanor attorneys in the receipt of
information might reflect stronger efforts by felony attorneys to unearth that information or
greater efforts by felony prosecutors in withholding evidence during discovery.
144 See Appendix, Model 3D.
145 See infra Section V.C.
146 FISHER ET AL., supra note 92, FAQ Appendix.
147 Interview with Public Defender C.
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defenders gave to the importance of researching the legal issues in the

case in preparing before negotiations (4.41, between "relatively" and
"extremely" important).
Despite these high ratings for the perceived importance of
knowledge of the legal issues in a particular case for negotiation
purposes, the attorneys reported that they actually did legal research
during preparations for bargaining less often, somewhere between
"sometimes" and "usually," averaging 3.63. This gap between

aspirations and self-declared practice is especially troubling for
adherents of the shadow-of-trial theory. Within this framework, what
matters are the legal arguments that will shape the trial. And without
adequate legal research, the defense attorney will never see all of the
opportunities.
Does this gap between valuing legal research for its importance to
negotiation outcomes and actually doing that research simply confirm
that overworked public defenders do not have time to do the research
before bargaining in most cases? There is support for this explanation

when we break down the responses by the type of case the attorney is
handling. As Table 7 shows, attorneys handling a misdemeanor
caseload report the lowest levels of pre-bargaining legal research (3.49)
while felony attorneys averaged 3.72.148
Table 7: How often do you engage in legal research as you prepare for
bargaining?

1 = Never
2 = Infrequently
3 = Sometimes
4 = Usually
5 = Always
Total
Average Score

Misdemeanor
Attorneys
0
8
45
39
9
101
3.49

Felony
Attorneys
0
9
92
114
39
254
3.72

Yet misdemeanor attorneys might need legal research the most.
Misdemeanor cases can involve significant legal issues, such as the
constitutionality of a public order offense statute or whether the
prosecution properly alleged every element of the offense.149 For

148 The misdemeanor-to-felony difference is significant, with a t-value of -2.61627 and p =
.004636.
149 Roberts, supra note 84 (describing how misdemeanors can raise complex legal issues).
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example, one defender noted in an interview how "bench trials [in
misdemeanor cases] tend to be more about legal issues." The attorney
used the example of disorderly conduct, noting how a defender might
present an argument to the judge about whether the government can
make out each element of the offense.150
C.

Bargain Interactions

As we saw in Part IV, defender aspirations and preparation often
focus on client goals and needs. This suggests an active role for defense
offers during the negotiation, pointing out to the prosecutor various
outcomes that might not occur to someone thinking strictly about the
likely outcomes at trial. Instead, we see another gap between what
defenders say matters and what they report doing during actual
negotiations, where they remain passive despite low-quality offers from
the prosecution.
Negotiators can attempt to anchor a bargaining session by making
the first offer and making that offer highly favorable from their vantage
point.151 Anchoring-like other "best" negotiation practices-is not the
right approach for every plea bargaining session.152 But the literature on
anchoring in criminal cases suggests that it can often be an effective
negotiation practice.153
Our survey seeks to learn about the back-and-forth in typical plea
negotiations by asking a series of questions about how often each side
initiates the bargaining process, makes the first concrete offer, and
makes counter offers. The survey also asks defenders to characterize the
150 Interview with Public Defender H.

151 See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and
Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124, 1128-30 (1974) (introducing anchoring); see also Roberts & Wright,
supra note 9, at 1483-84 (discussing literature on anchoring). This phenomenon was originally
studied in civil settlements, but scholars and practitioners have since analyzed it in the plea
bargaining context. See Allison D. Redlich, Miko M. Wilford, & Shawn Bushway, Understanding
Guilty Pleas Through the Lens of Social Science, 23 PSYCH., PUB. POL'Y, & L. 458, 462 (2017)
(describing literature on anchoring); Molly J. Walker Wilson, Defense Attorney Bias and the Rush
to the Plea, 65 U. Kan. L. Rev. 271, 280-82 (2016).
152 See Roberts & Wright, supra note 9, at 1487 n.151 (noting how a defender might hold off
on making a first offer in jurisdictions or types of cases where discovery is not provided before
bargaining begins).
153 Burke, supra note 118, at 201(explaining that prosecutors' initial offers often serve as a
"high anchor that makes a subsequent, revised offer appear reasonable in comparison"). As one
negotiation scholar described it, a party who puts forth an opening offering that is highly
favorable to her own side "undermine[s] the confidence of the individuals on the other side, and
those people lower their aspiration levels. Negotiators should thus begin with higher demands or
lower offers-but they must start with positions they can rationally defend." Charles B. Craver,
Sharpening Your Legal NegotiatingSkills, 56 PRAC. LAW. 61, 62 (2010).
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favorability (or unfavorability) of both prosecutors' and their own first

offers.
They tell us that prosecutors initiate the bargaining discussion as
often as defenders themselves initiate (3.21 for prosecutors and 3.22 for
defenders, or just above "sometimes"). At the same time, prosecutors
"usually" make the first concrete offer (3.99). This suggests that even
when defenders do initiate a discussion about a potential guilty plea,
they typically wait for prosecutors to make the first offer. Misdemeanor
attorneys are especially likely to wait for a first offer from the
prosecutor. 154 Perhaps the power of the first offer for the defense is most
important in serious cases, where the defender has access to more
discovery material before bargaining.155 After all, in misdemeanor cases
in some jurisdictions, a large percentage of guilty pleas happen at
arraignment or an early appearance. 156 A related explanation could be
that, in the rush of high-volume misdemeanor courts, the attorneys
internalize the pressures for efficiency and follow what might be seen as
the quickest, easiest way to bargain-line up to hear the prosecutor's

offer in your cases that day, then relay those offers to clients.157
There are surely reasons in particular cases for defense lawyers to
delay any offers of their own. But the norm of waiting for a first offer
from the prosecutor, applied across the pool of cases overall, is
troubling because defenders receive first offers that they believe to be
poor ones. They reported that first offers were "somewhat unfavorable"
for their clients.158 And there are other indicators of the poor quality of
offers that prosecutors make: defenders report that they "sometimes"
receive "take it or leave it" offers and offers with time limits.159
Given this grim starting point, it is encouraging that defense

attorneys say they "usually" counteroffer.160 On the other hand,
defenders do not routinely make aggressive offers: close to half of the
154 The difference between misdemeanor attorneys and felony attorneys was significant, with
a t-value of 2.32171 and p = .010405.
155 Experienced defenders seem to appreciate more than others the power of the first offer.
Attorneys with more than fifteen years of defense experience averaged a response of 3.87 in
waiting for a first offer from the prosecutor, compared to 4.16 for attorneys with zero to three
years' experience.
156 SMITH & MADDAN, supra note 87.
157 This might help explain why misdemeanor attorneys had the highest average score, 2.83
(just below "sometimes"), when answering how frequently their "client accepts the first offer"
from the prosecutor. The average was 2.66 for general felony attorneys and 2.55 for special felony
unit attorneys.
158 The potential answers were 1 = extremely unfavorable, 2 = somewhat unfavorable, 3 =
reasonable, 4 = somewhat favorable, 5 = extremely favorable. Here, the average rating was 2.03.
159 The average for take-it-or-leave-it offers was 3.03; the average for offers with expiration
dates was 3.14.
160 The average response was 3.50, midway between "usually" and "always."
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defenders reported that their own first offers were "somewhat
unfavorable" or "very unfavorable" to their own clients. Only 15% of
defenders reported making first offers that were extremely favorable to
their own clients.161
The default of waiting for prosecutor offers is also worrisome in
cases where an aggressive first offer from the defense is likely to have
little downside risk. Attorneys reported that their clients "sometimes"
get a "higher sentence after trial than they probably would have received
after a guilty plea."162 Remarkably, almost a quarter of the attorneys
(and almost one-third of the misdemeanor attorneys) opined that their
63
clients "infrequently" or "never" paid a trial tax.1
The group of attorneys who perceived little or no trial tax
operating against their clients also reported that they made first offers
that were "reasonable" for the defendant (3.11) rather than "somewhat
favorable" or "extremely favorable."164 If the trial tax does not make a
defense offer costly, it is hard to see why these attorneys would make
middling offers for their clients.
Finally, the survey offers divergent clues about the speed of plea
negotiations. We asked attorneys how many minutes they spent in a
typical case "on all bargaining discussions or exchanges with the
prosecution" and on "advising your client" about the prosecutor's offer.
Misdemeanor attorneys claimed to spend an average of twenty minutes
per case bargaining with the prosecutor, and seventeen minutes per case
advising the client about the plea offer. For felony attorneys, the
65
estimates were longer, at thirty-four minutes per case.1
Based on our anecdotal sense of ordinary bargaining practices in
state criminal court, these times seem inflated; psychological biases and
incentives also suggest that respondents would enter a number here that
is unrealistically high. Yet it is plausible that attorneys would report
longer times for more serious cases. These reported times also seem
realistic, in a rough sense, by comparison to time studies used to analyze
funding levels for public defender offices. For instance, one weighted
caseload study estimated that defense attorneys spent an average of 571

161 The average response was 2.93, just below "reasonable."
162 The average response to this question was 3.21, closer to "sometimes" than "usually." The
average score for misdemeanor attorneys was 2.93.
163 Among misdemeanor attorneys, three responded "never" and thirty-three responded
"infrequently."
164 The low-trial-tax group reported first offers that were more pro-defendant than the offers
from the higher-trial-tax group (2.87), but we expected to find a larger difference.
165 These two questions offered four possible responses: zero to four minutes, five to fifteen
minutes, sixteen to thirty minutes, thirty-one to sixty minutes, and sixty-one or more minutes.
We calculated the average times that attorneys reported to us by taking the response within each
category as the median of that time range.
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minutes on each violent felony case, 413 minutes on each non-violent
felony, and 150 minutes on each misdemeanor.66 Spending a total of

thirty-seven minutes in actual negotiation and in advising clients about
the negotiation options in a misdemeanor case does not seem like an
outlandish claim, when viewed against this backdrop.

The communication methods that attorneys use for their
negotiations point more in the direction of rushed bargaining that
converges quickly on a consensus outcome. Table 8 summarizes how

often defenders claimed to use various methods of communication.
Table 8: How often do you use the following channels
communication during plea negotiations? (Average responses)
Misdemeanor
Attorneys
4.31

Felony
Attorneys
4.11

Telephone
In person, in office
Text message

3.23
2.22
1.65

3.43
2.73
2.04

Letter, via fax or postal service

1.52

2.00

In person, in courthouse
Email (with or without

of

attachments)

Scale: 5 = Always, 4 = Usually, 3 = Sometimes, 2 = Infrequently, 1 = Never
The rank order of these communication methods is consistent with
a shadow-of-the-client theory of negotiation that stresses the individual
and equitable dimensions of each defendant. It is difficult to imagine
client-specific and context-sensitive advocacy via text message. The low
rating attached to that cursory method of communication offers hope
for more expansive approaches to negotiation.

166 See MATTHEW KLEIMAN & CYNTHIA G. LEE, NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., VIRGINIA
INDIGENT DEFENSE COMMISSION ATTORNEY AND SUPPORT STAFF WORKLOAD ASSESSMENT:

FINAL REPORT 12 (2010). A comparable workload study in Maryland produced different
estimates for the time that defense attorneys spent in urban, suburban, and rural courts. For
violent felonies, the study found 908 (urban), 1,323 (suburban), and 1,353 (rural) minutes. BRIAN
J. OSTROM, MATTHEW KEIMAN, & CHRISTOPHER RYAN, NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., MARYLAND
ATTORNEY AND STAFF WORKLOAD ASSESSMENT 76 (2005). Comparable numbers for non-violent

felonies were 472, 831, and 792; for misdemeanors, they were 109, 145, and 142. Id.
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CONCLUSION

When public defenders describe the factors that they believe to be
important to preparation and to outcomes in plea negotiations, they
reveal a split of opinion. Some attorneys (particularly those with the
most years of experience and the greatest number of jury trials
conducted in the past) do seem to focus on the shadow of the trial. But
for other attorneys a different shadow matters. They talk about the
wants and needs of clients, the collateral consequences they face, and
the client's detention in pretrial custody. These factors bear on the
prosecutor's willingness to operate outside a trial-prediction
framework. These defense attorneys see themselves as something more
than technicians who predict trial outcomes.
This practice-informed theory of negotiation in criminal cases
forms a sound basis for evaluating the actual practices of defense
attorneys. The shadow-of-client theory expands the range of factors
that might change a negotiated outcome. And wider prospects for the
client necessarily imply more ways for the attorney to fall short. But
some defense attorneys embrace such expanded ambitions. Their
equity-based theory of negotiation in the shadow of the client tells them,
concretely, where new practices will pay off.
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APPENDIX: MULTIVARIATE ANALYSES

We treated the answers to several survey questions as variables and
divided them into content groups for purposes of this model. Group A
variables speak to case characteristics. They include survey answers

about the attorney's type of caseload (misdemeanor, general felony,
specialized felony, juvenile, traffic, and other, designating general
felony as the reference category); frequency of client experiencing a trial
penalty; importance of suppression issues to negotiated outcome;
importance of collateral consequences to negotiated outcome;
importance of client's custody status to negotiated outcome; and
importance of client's criminal history to negotiated outcome.
Group B variables address the background, characteristics, and
experiences of the defense attorney. These include the attorney's race
(African American, Asian, Hispanic, Native American, White, Other
Race, with attorneys able to select more than one race, combining

responses into White and Non-White); the attorney's gender; years of
experience as a defense attorney; number of jury trials the attorney has

litigated; number of bench trials the attorney has litigated; importance
of the attorney's reputation as a trial attorney to negotiated outcomes;
and prior experience of the defense attorney as a prosecutor.
Group C variables speak to the courthouse environment where
negotiations take place. These include the importance of prosecutor
office policy to negotiated outcomes, importance of prosecutor's
caseload to negotiated outcomes, and importance of defense attorney's
relationship with the prosecutor to negotiated outcomes.
Group D variables address the attorney's expressed beliefs about
important potential influences on negotiation outcomes in general.
They include the importance of the likelihood of conviction to
negotiated outcomes, the importance of the judge's likely sentencing

decision to negotiated outcomes, and the importance of the client's
wants and needs to negotiated outcomes.
Group E variables talk about attorney preparation before
negotiation. We treat two of these variables as indicators of a shadowof-trial theory of negotiation at work: the importance of predicting trial
outcomes as part of preparation for negotiation and the importance of
predicting a sentencing outcome as part of preparation. Two other
variables indicate for us the operation of a shadow-of-client theory: the
importance of a clear sense of the client's goals as part of preparation to
bargain and the importance of attorney knowledge of alternatives to
incarceration.
Finally, Group F variables deal with attorney practices during
negotiation. They include several factors that we associate with a
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shadow-of-trial theory: frequency of signaling plans to conduct a
vigorous motions practice, frequency of bluffing about potential
defenses at trial, and frequency of waiting for the prosecutor to initiate
negotiations. Other behavioral claims we associate with a shadow-ofclient theory: frequency of exploring collateral consequences and
frequency of sharing new information with the prosecutor before trial.
Tables below provide descriptive statistics and further information
about our construction of these variables.
We believed that the survey responses related to case
characteristics, attorney background, courthouse environment, and
attorney beliefs about negotiations would influence the way that those
attorneys prepared for negotiation. That is, we hypothesized that some
variables from Groups A, B, C, and D would operate as independent
variables and that some of them would show a statistically significant
association with variables from Group E. The Group E variables did not
satisfy the preconditions for creating a single additive index, so we
developed a separate model for each of the four measures in Group E.
In Models IA through 1D, we use the responses from Groups A, B, and
C as independent variables and the Group E responses as four different
dependent variables. Models 2A through 2D add the variables from
Group D as additional independent variables for the same four
dependent variables.
A further set of Models treat the responses from Groups A through
E as independent variables and the responses from Group F as the
dependent variables. We hypothesize that the case characteristics,
attorney background, courthouse environment, attorney beliefs about
negotiation trends, and attorney beliefs about preparation for
negotiation all combine to influence their self-reported behavior during
negotiation. Models 3A through 3D present the results of these analyses.
We conducted ordered logistic analyses because the dependent
variables are categorical and ordered, ranging from 1 to 5; OLS
regressions based on these models produced similar results.
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Model JA, Dependent Variable = Trial Outcome Prediction,
Importance to Preparationfor Bargaining

Shadow-of-TrialIndicator1
Independent
Variables
Group A, Case
Charateristics
Type of Caseload
Misdemeanor
Juvenile
Traffic
Specialized Felony
Other
Frequency of Trial
Penalty
Suppression Issues,
importance to
outcome
Collateral
Consequences,
importance to

Coef.

Std. Err.

Z

P>Iz

-. 2288697
.15544
-. 0504339
1.035066
.0431851
.0183311

.2940499
.2661682
.3962109
1.24449
.6865229
.111701

-0.78
0.58
-0.13
0.83
0.06
0.16

0.436
0.559
0.899
0.406
0.950
0.870

.3285419**

.1000275

3.28

0.001

-. 1040653

.0904494

-1.15

0.250

.1630399

.1063638

1.53

0.125

.413889**

.1547988

2.67

0.008

.0473619**

.0149535

3.17

0.002

-. 1771884

.1207993

-1.47

0.142

.1352512

.1025989

1.32

0.187

.1092947

.0964747

1.13

0.257

outcome

Client Custody Status,
importance to
outcome

Client Criminal
History, importance
to outcome

Group B, Attorney
Characteristics and

Experiences
Years of Experience as
Defense Attorney
Number of Jury Trials

Litigated
Number of Bench
Trials Litigated
Reputation of
Defender as Trial
Attorney, importance
to outcome
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.2849386

.3193272

0.89

0.372

.0447408
-. 3918522**

.2842611
.1984165

0.16
-1.97

0.875
0.048

.0199358

.0861462

0.23

0.817

.253154**

.0991013

2.55

0.011

.0690957

.0899669

0.77

0.442

.5264204
Cut 1
2.249059
Cut 2
4.219601
Cut 3
5.535156
Cut 4
Log likelihood: -454.8258
Pseudo R 2: 0.0793
N: 455
*p < 0.05 **p < 0.01

1.458916
1.364188
1.356536
1.366867

Prior Experience of
Defender as
Prosecutor
White
Male
Group C, Courthouse
Environment
Prosecutor Office
Policy, importance to
outcome

Relationship of
Defender and
Prosecutor,

importance to
outcome

Prosecutor Caseload,
importance to
outcome
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Model lB, Dependent Variable = Sentence Prediction,Importance to

Preparationfor Bargaining
Shadow-of-Trial Indicator2
Independent Variables

Coef.

Std. Err.

Z

P>Iz

-. 3118461
.0741804
-. 1733911
1.00134
.0171893
.0318444
.2324356**

.2960569
.2650175
.390193
1.264878
.6901309
.1108955
.0989451

-1.05
0.28
-0.44
0.79
0.02
0.29
2.35

0.292
0.780
0.657
0.429
0.980
0.774
0.019

.0642083

.089289

0.72

0.472

.1476987

.1029064

1.44

0.151

.4202043**

.1552728

2.71

0.007

.0401554

.0145936

2.75

0.006

-. 2506963*

.1199849

-2.09

0.037

.1718566

.1015321

1.69

0.091

.1498504

.0959898

1.56

0.118

.5574196

.3071923

1.81

0.070

.0970076
-. 1736964

.2751489
.1952393

0.35
-0.89

0.724
0.374

.0238221

.0847371

0.28

0.779

.173713*

.09708

1.79

0.074

Group A, Case Charateristics

Type of Caseload
Misdemeanor
Juvenile
Traffic
Specialized Felony
Other
Frequency of Trial Penalty
Suppression Issues,
importance to outcome
Collateral Consequences,
importance to outcome
Client Custody Status,
importance to outcome
Client Criminal History,
importance to outcome
Group B, Attorney
Characteristics and

Experiences
Years of Experience as

Defense Attorney
Number of Jury Trials

Litigated
Number of Bench Trials

Litigated
Reputation of Defender as
Trial Attorney, importance
to outcome
Prior Experience of
Defender as Prosecutor
White
Male
Group C, Courthouse
Environment
Prosecutor Office Policy,
importance to outcome
Relationship of Defender
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and Prosecutor, importance
to outcome

Prosecutor Caseload,

-. 0238824

.090052

2.191317
4.475104
5.811033

1.359843
1.340177
1.350873

importance to outcome

Cut 1
Cut 2
Cut 3
Log likelihood: -447.12529
Pseudo R 2: 0.0671
N: 456
*p < .05 **p < .01

-0.27

0.791
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Model 1C, Dependent Variable = Clear Sense of Client Goals,
Importance to Preparationfor Bargaining
Shadow-of-Client Indicator1

Independent Variables
Group A, Case Charateristics
Type of Caseload
Misdemeanor
Juvenile
Traffic
Specialized Felony
Other
Frequency of Trial Penalty
Suppression Issues,
importance to outcome
Collateral Consequences,
importance to outcome
Client Custody Status,
importance to outcome
Client Criminal History,
importance to outcome
Group B, Attorney
Characteristics and

Coef.

Std. Err.

Z

P> z

-.4543293
.1048264
.2436694
-. 1418224
15.12356
-. 0073711
.1861607

.3828356
.3458817
.5336721
1.305997
821.8054
.1437902
.1277682

-1.19
0.30
0.46
-0.11
0.02
-0.05
1.46

0.235
0.762
0.648
0.914
0.985
0.959
0.145

.3236048**

.1125384

2.88

0.004

.392214**

.1295142

3.03

0.002

.2260346

.203388

1.11

0.266

.0059949

.0178099

0.34

0.736

-.014231

.1527188

-0.09

0.926

.051668

.1279621

0.40

0.686

.0244855

.1236416

0.20

0.843

1.001074**

.3640425

2.75

0.006

.1801421
.1294902

.3648772
.2580238

0.49
0.50

0.622
0.616

.1098

.1109137

0.99

0.322

Experiences
Years of Experience as
Defense Attorney
Number of Jury Trials

Litigated
Number of Bench Trials

Litigated
Reputation of Defender as
Trial Attorney, importance
to outcome

Prior Experience of
Defender as Prosecutor
White
Male
Group C, Courthouse
Environment
Prosecutor Office Policy,
importance to outcome
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-.0358039

.1304567

-0.27

0.784

Prosecutor Caseload,
importance to outcome
Cut 1
Cut 2

.0364145

.117734

0.31

0.757

0.8577266
3.816957

1.94634
1.689477

Cut 3

5.710192

1.694635

Relationship of Defender
and Prosecutor, importance
to outcome

Log likelihood: -250.11442
Pseudo R 2: 0.0864
N: 456
* <.05 ** < .01

1350

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:4

Model 1D, Dependent Variable = Knowledge of Alternatives to Prison,
Importance to Preparationfor Bargaining

Shadow-of-Client Indicator2
Independent Variables
Group A, Case Charateristics
Type of Caseload
Misdemeanor
Juvenile
Traffic
Specialized Felony
Other
Frequency of Trial Penalty
Suppression Issues,
importance to outcome
Collateral Consequences,
importance to outcome
Client Custody Status,
importance to outcome
Client Criminal History,
importance to outcome
Group B, Attorney
Characteristics and

Coef.

Std. Err.

Z

P> z

.2285272
.1233109
-.4587881
-. 1871213
.9359873
.0474539
.4257311**

.2805186
.2463204
.3795335
.9067455
.6320365
.103015
.0958524

0.81
0.50
-1.21
-0.21
1.48
0.46
4.44

0.415
0.617
0.227
0.837
0.139
0.645
0.000

.4493687**

.084798

5.30

0.000

.4637409**

.1006567

4.61

0.000

.3013276*

.150562

2.00

0.045

.0590004**

.0135121

4.37

0.000

-. 2561673*

.1147345

-2.23

0.026

-. 1227101

.0925159

-1.33

0.185

.1375704

.092718

1.48

0.138

.1011105

.2891083

0.35

0.727

.0556554
-.3741073*

.2620915
.1871885

0.21
-2.00

0.832
0.046

.0112743

.0823129

0.14

0.891

Experiences
Years of Experience as
Defense Attorney
Number of Jury Trials

Litigated
Number of Bench Trials

Litigated
Reputation of Defender as
Trial Attorney, importance
to outcome

Prior Experience of
Defender as Prosecutor
White
Male
Group C, Courthouse
Environment
Prosecutor Office Policy,
importance to outcome
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.2427138*

.0939004

2.58

0.010

.1262531

.0846002

1.49

0.136

.8577266
3.816957
5.710192

1.94634
1.689477
1.694635

to outcome

Prosecutor Caseload,
importance to outcome
Cut 1
Cut 2
Cut 3
Log likelihood: -250.11442
Pseudo R2 :0.0864
N: 456
* <.05** <.01
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Model 2A, Dependent Variable = Trial Outcome Prediction,
Importance to Preparationfor Bargaining

Shadow-of-Trial Indicator1
Independent Variables
Group A, Case Charateristics
Type of Caseload
Misdemeanor
Juvenile
Traffic
Specialized Felony
Other
Frequency of Trial Penalty
Suppression Issues,
importance to outcome
Collateral Consequences,
importance to outcome
Client Custody Status,
importance to outcome
Client Criminal History,
importance to outcome
Group B, Attorney
Characteristics and

Coef.

Std. Err.

Z

P> z

-. 0391246
.1810525
-. 0527996
1.015557
-. 0384528
-. 027219
.2451586*

.3055849
.2723282
.4083308
1.272608
.6975112
.1149037
.1029792

-0.13
0.66
-0.13
0.80
-0.06
-0.24
2.38

0.898
0.506
0.897
0.425
0.956
0.813
0.017

-.2437634*

.1051499

-2.32

0.020

.0341839

.1170843

0.29

0.770

.3119692

.160595

1.94

0.052

.0475084*

.0153483

3.10

0.002

-.2040903

.1224457

-1.67

0.096

.0847277

.1069741

0.79

0.428

.0736834

.0988564

0.75

0.456

.3063978

.3272799

0.94

0.349

.0455716
-.4638959*

.2904515
.2033735

0.16
-2.28

0.875
0.023

-.0081675

.0889708

-0.09

0.927

Experiences
Years of Experience as
Defense Attorney
Number of Jury Trials

Litigated
Number of Bench Trials

Litigated
Reputation of Defender as
Trial Attorney, importance
to outcome
Prior Experience of
Defender as Prosecutor
White
Male
Group C, Courthouse

Environment
Prosecutor Office Policy,
importance to outcome
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.2690097

.1020714

2.64

0.008

.0133829

.0917081

0.15

0.884

.3245793**

.1024768

3.17

0.002

.339686**

.0959359

3.54

0.000

.1529035

.124697

1.23

0.220

1.179862
2.920476
4.945564
6.330565

1.492172
1.400111
1.396553
1.409264

to outcome*

Prosecutor Caseload,
importance to outcome

Group D, Beliefs About
Negotiation
Probability of Conviction,
importance to outcome

Likely Sentence, importance
to outcome

Clients Wants and Needs,
importance to outcome

Cut 1
Cut 2
Cut 3
Cut 4
Log likelihood: -439.65372
Pseudo R2 : 0.1080
N: 453
* <.05 ** < .01
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Model 2B, Dependent Variable = Sentence Prediction, Importance to
Preparationfor Bargaining

Shadow-of-Trial Indicator2
Independent Variables
Group A, Case Charateristics
Type of Caseload
Misdemeanor
Juvenile
Traffic
Specialized Felony
Other
Frequency of Trial Penalty
Suppression Issues,

Coef.

Std. Err.

Z

P>Iz

-. 1439771
.0818549
-. 1519729
1.037237
-.0379029
-.0111686
.1445148

.3089943
.272183
.4057531
1.304893
.7063626
.1147156
.1025028

-0.47
0.30
-0.37
0.79
-0.05
-0.10
1.41

0.641
0.764
0.708
0.427
0.957
0.922
0.159

-.0333744

.1035748

-0.32

0.747

.0487063

.1134927

0.43

0.668

.3038911

.1616962

1.88

0.060

.0389854*

.0150389

2.59

0.010

-. 2814387*

.1218608

-2.31

0.021

.1181702

.1056403

1.12

0.263

.1045487

.0993351

1.05

0.293

.6177148*

.3143604

1.96

0.049

.1237864
-.2672315

.2824819
.2016301

0.44
-1.33

0.661
0.185

-.0156614

.0879285

-0.18

0.859

importance to outcome

Collateral Consequences,
importance to outcome
Client Custody Status,
importance to outcome
Client Criminal History,
importance to outcome
Group B, Attorney
Characteristics and
Experiences
Years of Experience as
Defense Attorney
Number of Jury Trials

Litigated
Number of Bench Trials

Litigated
Reputation of Defender as
Trial Attorney, importance
to outcome

Prior Experience of
Defender as Prosecutor
White
Male

Group C, Courthouse
Environment
Prosecutor Office Policy,
importance to outcome
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.1793926

.1005773

1.78

0.074

-. 0948671

.0927783

-1.02

0.307

.3408679**

.103489

3.29

0.001

.4192136**

.096416

4.35

0.000

.0434379

.1212803

0.36

0.720

2.802379
5.161843
6.581763

1.402905
1.389219
1.402429

to outcome

Prosecutor Caseload,
importance to outcome

Group D, Beliefs About
Negotiation
Probability of Conviction,
importance to outcome
Likely Sentence, importance
to outcome

Clients Wants and Needs,
importance to outcome

Cut 1
Cut 2
Cut 3
Log likelihood: -429.08016
Pseudo R2: 0.1026
N: 454
* <.05 ** < .01
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Model 2C, Dependent Variable = Clear Sense of Client Goals,
Importance to Preparationfor Bargaining

Shadow-of-Client Indicator1
Independent Variables
Group A, Case Charateristics
Type of Caseload
Misdemeanor
Juvenile
Traffic
Specialized Felony
Other
Frequency of Trial Penalty
Suppression Issues,
importance to outcome
Collateral Consequences,
importance to outcome
Client Custody Status,
importance to outcome
Client Criminal History,
importance to outcome
Group B, Attorney
Characteristics and

Coef.

Std. Err.

Z

P> z

-.2030598
.1560862
.2571094
-.2015789
15.05956
.0001329
.1125838

.3972277
.3527778
.5475221
1.29227
767.3054
.1478079
.1346528

-0.51
0.44
0.47
-0.16
0.02
0.00
0.84

0.609
0.658
0.639
0.876
0.984
0.999
0.403

.1448365

.1257485

1.15

0.249

.2309009

.1418719

1.63

0.104

.1388633

.214544

0.65

0.517

.0020016

.0182027

0.11

0.912

.0112155

.157137

0.07

0.943

.045927

.1316822

0.35

0.727

-.0123838

.1262402

-0.10

0.922

1.033308**

.3681423

2.81

0.005

.1899626
.1917722

.3719536
.2638318

0.51
0.73

0.610
0.467

.1259125

.1143267

1.10

0.271

Experiences
Years of Experience as
Defense Attorney
Number of Jury Trials

Litigated
Number of Bench Trials

Litigated
Reputation of Defender as
Trial Attorney, importance
to outcome
Prior Experience of
Defender as Prosecutor
White
Male
Group C, Courthouse
Environment
Prosecutor Office Policy,
importance to outcome
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-. 009529

.1340998

-0.07

0.943

.0108648

.1195734

0.09

0.928

.156086

.1331665

1.17

0.241

.0589868

.1227332

0.48

0.631

.4442898**

.143886

3.09

0.002

1.724421
4.699625
6.638448

2.001691
1.752242
1.761807

to outcome

Prosecutor Caseload,
importance to outcome

Group D, Beliefs About
Negotiation
Probability of Conviction,
importance to outcome

Likely Sentence, importance
to outcome

Clients Wants and Needs,
importance to outcome

Cut 1
Cut 2
Cut 3
Log likelihood: -243.72281
Pseudo R2 : 0.1083
N: 454
*p <.05 ** < .01
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Model 2D, Dependent Variable = Knowledge of Alternatives to Prison,
Importance to Preparationfor Bargaining

Shadow-of-ClientIndicator2
Independent Variables
Group A, Case Charateristics
Type of Caseload
Misdemeanor
Juvenile
Traffic
Specialized Felony
Other
Frequency of Trial Penalty
Suppression Issues,
importance to outcome
Collateral Consequences,
importance to outcome
Client Custody Status,
importance to outcome
Client Criminal History,
importance to outcome
Group B, Attorney
Characteristics and

Coef.

Std. Err.

Z

P> z

.4488076
.150697
-.4871791
-.3106042
.9436483
.0350281
.3500245**

.2869325
.2471797
.3863906
.9006488
.6595715
.1046511
.0972203

1.56
0.61
-1.26
-0.34
1.43
0.33
3.60

0.118
0.542
0.207
0.730
0.153
0.738
0.000

.2925287**

.0950015

3.08

0.002

.3538715**

.1050115

3.37

0.001

.2283511

.1533849

1.49

0.137

.0577509

.0135868

4.25

0.000

-.2384655*

.1147436

-2.08

0.038

-. 1612238

.0938322

-1.72

0.086

.1012567

.0934581

1.08

0.279

.1361346

.2925567

0.47

0.642

.0342257
-.3853084*

.2657127
.1885592

0.13
-2.04

0.898
0.041

.0006708

.0835858

0.01

0.994

Experiences
Years of Experience as
Defense Attorney
Number of Jury Trials

Litigated
Number of Bench Trials
Litigated
Reputation of Defender as
Trial Attorney, importance
to outcome
Prior Experience of Defender
as Prosecutor
White
Male
Group C, Courthouse
Environment
Prosecutor Office Policy,
importance to outcome
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.278581*

.0957373

2.91

0.004

.1028824

.0845289

1.22

0.224

.3315065*

.096082

3.45

0.001

.138445

.0900473

1.54

0.124

.3118669*

.1155018

2.70

0.007

5.721022
7.68011
9.280356
10.46431

1.345345
1.344755
1.36294
1.383625

to outcome

Prosecutor Caseload,
importance to outcome

Group D, Beliefs About
Negotiation
Probability of Conviction,
importance to outcome

Likely Sentence, importance
to outcome

Clients Wants and Needs,
importance to outcome

Cut 1
Cut 2
Cut 3
Cut 4
Log likelihood: -546.15191
Pseudo R2: 0.1516
N: 465
* < .05 **p < .01
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Model 3A, Dependent Variable = Frequency of BargainingAbout
CollateralConsequences
Independent Variables
Group A, Case Charateristics
Type of Caseload
Misdemeanor
Juvenile
Traffic
Specialized Felony
Other
Frequency of Trial Penalty
Suppression Issues,
importance to outcome
Collateral Consequences,
importance to outcome
Client Custody Status,
importance to outcome
Client Criminal History,
importance to outcome
Group B, Attorney
Characteristics and

Coef.

Std. Err.

Z

P>z

.2726723
.3791617
1.146777**
-.8938855
.4958187
-. 089721
.0206046

.283704
.2442892
.4008758
1.02081
.6509296
.1053815
.1000653

0.96
1.55
2.86
-0.88
0.76
-0.85
0.21

0.336
0.121
0.004
0.381
0.446
0.395
0.837

.5959857**

.0968508

6.15

0.000

-. 2117324

.1078661

-1.96

0.050

-. 087754

.1547731

-0.57

0.571

.001474

.0136712

0.11

0.914

.0778755

.1130507

0.69

0.491

-.0046396

.0956031

-0.05

0.961

.0312043

.0883442

0.35

0.724

.0073469

.2965739

0.02

0.980

-. 6262653*
-. 1785408

.2744872
.1879148

-2.28
-0.95

0.023
0.342

-. 0678917

.0816679

-0.83

0.406

.2429475*

.0943528

2.57

0.010

Experiences
Years of Experience as
Defense Attorney
Number of Jury Trials

Litigated
Number of Bench Trials

Litigated
Reputation of Defender as
Trial Attorney, importance
to outcome
Prior Experience of
Defender as Prosecutor
White
Male
Group C, Courthouse
Environment
Prosecutor Office Policy,
importance to outcome
Relationship of Defender

and Prosecutor, importance
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to outcome

Prosecutor Caseload,
importance to outcome
Group D, Beliefs About
Negotiation
Prediction of Trial Outcome,
importance to negotiation

.010877

.0826703

0.13

0.895

.0284213

.0964741

0.29

0.768

-. 1123911

.0922113

-1.22

0.223

-.1841094

.1221843

-1.51

0.132

-. 1913072

.1688454

-1.13

0.257

.090166

.17678

0.51

0.610

.6580714**

.2028029

3.24

0.001

.2101821*

.0980658

2.14

0.032

-1.419633
.3420444
2.711016
4.703814

1.520417
.461615
1.462032
1.473139

outcome

Prediction of Sentence,
importance to negotiation
outcome

Client's Wants and Needs,
importance to negotiation
outcome

Group E, Preparation for
Negotiation
Prediction of Trial Outcome,
importance to preparation
Prediction of Sentence,
importance to

preparation

Clear Sense of Client's Goals,
importance to preparation
Knowledge of Alternatives to
Incarceration, importance to

preparation
Cut 1
Cut2
Cut 3
Cut 4
Log likelihood: -500.27143
Pseudo R 2 : 0.0970
N: 447
i*p < .05 **p < .01
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Model 3B, Dependent Variable = Frequency of Signals Regarding
Vigorous Motions Practice

Independent Variables

Coef.

Std. Err.

Z

P>z

Group A, Case Charateristics
Type of Caseload
Misdemeanor
Juvenile
Traffic
Specialized Felony
Other
Frequency of Trial Penalty
Suppression Issues,
importance to outcome
Collateral Consequences,

.072081
.4400183
.7390442
-2.319471*
.1736679
.0502849
-.0019579

.2857948
.2401571
.3872215
1.156568
.612495
.1058832
.0936275

0.25
1.83
1.91
-2.01
0.28
0.47
-0.02

0.801
0.067
0.056
0.045
0.777
0.635
0.983

.1719492

.0932737

1.84

0.065

.1260516

.1067536

1.18

0.238

-. 0395391

.1538999

-0.26

0.797

-.0080917

.0132134

-0.61

0.540

-.0358176

.1097047

-0.33

0.744

.0023945

.0944203

0.03

0.980

.2413335**

.0882461

2.73

0.006

-.1472289

.289278

-0.51

0.611

-. 2644648
-. 1545819

.2608826
.1847062

-1.01
-0.84

0.311
0.403

.0684338

.0808423

0.85

0.397

-. 1534041

.0930172

-1.65

0.099

importance to outcome

Client Custody Status,
importance to outcome
Client Criminal History,
importance to outcome
Group B, Attorney
Characteristics and

Experiences
Years of Experience as
Defense Attorney
Number of Jury Trials

Litigated
Number of Bench Trials

Litigated
Reputation of Defender as
Trial Attorney, importance
to outcome

Prior Experience of
Defender as Prosecutor
White
Male
Group C, Courthouse
Environment
Prosecutor Office Policy,
importance to outcome
Relationship of Defender

and Prosecutor, importance
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to outcome

Prosecutor Caseload,

.0587262

.0833516

0.70

0.481

-. 2056434*

.0930393

-2.21

0.027

-.2318581*

.0908864

-2.55

0.011

-.0577862

.1215868

-0.48

0.635

.2106683

.1741795

1.21

0.226

-. 0176093

.1800609

-0.10

0.922

.248584

.1913421

1.30

0.194

.0565935

.0918174

0.62

0.538

-3.539632
-.3563456
1.982287
3.921355

1.526212
1.414936
1.417828
1.428017

importance to outcome

Group D, Beliefs About
Negotiation
Prediction of Trial Outcome,
importance to negotiation
outcome

Prediction of Sentence,
importance to negotiation
outcome

Client's Wants and Needs,
importance to negotiation
outcome

Group E, Preparation for
Negotiation
Prediction of Trial Outcome,
importance to preparation
Prediction of Sentence,
importance to preparation
Clear Sense of Client's Goals,
importance to preparation
Knowledge of Alternatives to
Incarceration, importance to
preparation
Cut 1
Cut 2
Cut 3
Cut 4
Log likelihood: -538.37452
Pseudo R 2: 0.0391
N: 446
* <.05 ** < .01
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Model 3C, Dependent Variable = Frequency of Bluffing About Potential
Defenses at Trial
Independent Variables
Group A, Case Charateristics
Type of Caseload
Misdemeanor
Juvenile
Traffic
Specialized Felony
Other
Frequency of Trial Penalty
Suppression Issues,

Coef.

Std. Err.

Z

P>|z

.1415319
-.2493253
-.275167
-1.12049
-. 1005854
.147273
-. 1226654

.2822376
.2377608
.3691935
1.05725
.6150642
.1043375
.0946691

0.50
-1.05
-0.75
-1.06
-0.16
1.41
-1.30

0.616
0.294
0.456
0.289
0.870
0.158
0.195

.017775

.0909574

0.20

0.845

.055046

.1047082

0.53

0.599

-. 0111144

.1513078

-0.07

0.941

-.0073638

.0131884

-0.56

0.577

-.0106654

.1107121

-0.10

0.923

-.2076994*

.0939134

-2.21

0.027

.2856462**

.0870388

3.28

0.001

.1567491

.2933024

0.53

0.593

.3301428
.2377337

.2648779
.183677

1.25
1.29

0.213
0.196

-. 183102*

.0800504

-2.29

0.022

-. 071726

.0919789

-0.78

0.436

importance to outcome

Collateral Consequences,
importance to outcome
Client Custody Status,
importance to outcome
Client Criminal History,
importance to outcome
Group B, Attorney
Characteristics and

Experiences
Years of Experience as
Defense Attorney
Number of Jury Trials

Litigated
Number of Bench Trials

Litigated
Reputation of Defender as
Trial Attorney, importance
to outcome

Prior Experience of
Defender as Prosecutor
White
Male
Group C, Courthouse
Environment
Prosecutor Office Policy,
importance to outcome
Relationship of Defender

and Prosecutor, importance
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.0799494

.0808462

0.99

0.323

-.0028936

.0932614

-0.03

0.975

.0334789

.0898524

0.37

0.709

-. 1840636

.1167053

-1.58

0.115

.4205781*

.1661892

2.53

0.011

-. 3798555*

.1724455

-2.20

0.028

.0585453

.1869902

0.31

0.754

-. 1742251

.0943229

-1.85

0.065

-1.610091
.2549305
2.61041
4.930484

1.413002
1.409293
1.419453
1.523283

importance to outcome

Group D, Beliefs About
Negotiation
Prediction of Trial Outcome,
importance to negotiation
outcome
Prediction of Sentence,
importance to negotiation
outcome

Client's Wants and Needs,
importance to negotiation
outcome

Group E, Preparation for
Negotiation
Prediction of Trial Outcome,
importance to preparation
Prediction of Sentence,

importance

to

preparation

Clear Sense of Client's Goals,
importance to preparation
Knowledge of Alternatives to
Incarceration, importance to

preparation
Cut 1
Cut 2
Cut 3
Cut 4
Log likelihood: -541.94826
Pseudo R2 0.0398
N: 448
* <.05 **p < .01
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Model 3D, Dependent Variable = Frequency of SharingInformation
with Prosecutor
Independent Variables
Group A, Case

Coef.

Std. Err.

Z

P>Iz

.2897525
.035509
-.089572
.3290439
1.330947*
.0572303
.215945*

.2977486
.2535517
.3947774
1.06079
.6373981
.1064294
.0977017

0.97
0.14
-0.23
0.31
2.09
0.54
2.21

0.330
0.889
0.821
0.756
0.037
0.591
0.027

.2024951

.0946056

2.14

0.032

-.0567999

.1069275

-0.53

0.595

.2879177

.1575834

1.83

0.068

-. 0042207

.013505

-0.31

0.755

.0325474

.1134107

0.29

0.774

-.2494491*

.0983218

-2.54

0.011

-. 3109449**

.0905565

-3.43

0.001

-.4050491

.2935478

-1.38

0.168

.1289069
-.0222497

.2767338
.1922103

0.47
-0.12

0.641
0.908

.0425258

.0820998

0.52

0.604

.3675474**

.095642

3.84

0.000

Charateristics
Type of Caseload
Misdemeanor
Juvenile
Traffic
Specialized Felony
Other
Frequency of Trial Penalty
Suppression Issues,
importance to outcome
Collateral Consequences,
importance to outcome
Client Custody Status,
importance to outcome
Client Criminal History,
importance to outcome

Group B, Attorney
Characteristics and

Experiences
Years of Experience as
Defense Attorney
Number of Jury Trials

Litigated
Number of Bench Trials

Litigated
Reputation of Defender as
Trial Attorney, importance
to outcome
Prior Experience of
Defender as Prosecutor
White
Male
Group C, Courthouse
Environment
Prosecutor Office Policy,
importance to outcome
Relationship of Defender
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and Prosecutor, importance
to outcome

Prosecutor Caseload,
importance to outcome
Group D, Beliefs About
Negotiation
Prediction of Trial
Outcome, importance to
negotiation outcome
Prediction of Sentence,
importance to negotiation

.1864124*

.0841894

2.21

0.027

-.0157902

.0980688

-0.16

0.872

-. 0313187

.0923089

-0.34

0.734

-. 0051319

.1213321

-0.04

0.966

.1334803

.1724016

0.77

0.439

.0050131

.1784378

0.03

0.978

.3369567

.1933702

1.74

0.081

-.0791956

.0951023

-0.83

0.405

-1.806012
2.619521
5.277482
8.16533

1.731596
1.428428
1.449104
1.478991

outcome

Client's Wants and Needs,
importance to negotiation
outcome

Group E, Preparation for
Negotiation
Prediction of Trial
Outcome, importance to
preparation

Prediction of Sentence,
importance to preparation
Clear Sense of Client's
Goals, importance to
preparation
Knowledge of Alternatives
to Incarceration,

importance to preparation
Cut 1
Cut 2
Cut 3
Cut 4
Log likelihood: -469.56729
Pseudo R2 : 0.0669
N: 449
* <.05 **p < .01

The results presented in the Appendix tables reveal some
noteworthy trends as to the impact of case characteristics (Group A) on
the attorneys' preparation for bargaining (Models lA through 2D).
Emphasis on suppression issues is positively related to the importance
that attorneys place on several factors that matter during preparation
for bargaining (see Models 1A, 1B, 1D, 2A, and 2D). Placing high
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importance on clients' criminal history is positively related both to
shadow-of-trial indicators during preparation (Models 1A, 1B) and to
one shadow-of-client indicator (Model 1D). As we expected, believing

that collateral consequences are important to the case outcome is
associated most frequently with shadow-of-client indicators (Models
1C, 1D, and 2D), but we were surprised to see that it is also associated
with one shadow-of-trial indicator (Model 2A). Client custody status is
positively related to the value that prosecutors place on shadow-ofclient indicators during their preparation for bargaining (Models 1C,
1D, and 2D).

When it comes to the influence of attorney characteristics and
experiences (Group B), we found surprising results. While we did not
hypothesize that gender was correlated with valuing any particular type
of preparation for bargaining, we found that identifying as male is
negatively related to the importance that individuals place on shadowof-trial factors (Models lA and 2A) and shadow-of-client factors
(Models 1D and 2D) during preparation for bargaining. The number of
years of experience as a defense attorney is mostly associated with
shadow-of-trial factors (Models 1A, 2A, and 2B) but also with one
shadow-of-client factor (Model 1D). Prior experience serving as a
prosecutor is positively related to a shadow-of-client preparation
activity (Models 1C and 2C) and a shadow-of-trial preparation activity
(Model 2B). The number of jury trials litigated is negatively related to a
shadow-of-client preparation activity (Models 1D and 2D) and to a
shadow-of-trial preparation activity (Models 1B and 2B).
We find mixed results regarding the influence of courthouse
environment factors (Group C). Although most of the courthouse
environment factors had no significant effect, valuing the relationship
of the defender and prosecutor is positively related to shadow-of-trial
indicators of bargain preparation (see Models lA and 1B) and to one
shadow-of-client indicator (Models 1D and 2D).
As to beliefs about negotiation, our results reveal strong
associations. Attorneys who emphasize the importance of knowing the
probability of conviction also put extra weight on two shadow-of-trial
preparation activities (Models 2A and 2B) and one shadow-of-client
preparation activity (Model 2D). An abstract belief in the importance
of the client's wishes was positively associated (unsurprisingly) with
knowing about client priorities and learning about alternatives to prison
as important aspects of preparation for bargaining (Models 2C and 2D).

An abstract belief in the importance of the likely sentence in the case is
associated with efforts to predict the likely outcome at trial and sentence
in preparation for the negotiations (Models 2A and 2B).
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Descriptive Statistics
Variable
Misdemeanor
Juvenile
Traffic
Specialized Felony
Other
Frequency Trial
Penalty
Suppression
Issues, importance

Observations
579
579
579
579
579
518

Mean
.208981
.4006908
.0794473
.0086356
.0379965
3.214286

Std. Dev.
.4069324
.4904622
.2706695
.0926057
.1913532
.9300634

Min
0
0
0
0
0
1

Max
1
1
1
1
1
5

496

3.794484

1.069948

1

5

498

3.74498

1.173665

1

5

499

4.142328

1.030421

1

5

497

4.61894

.6382909

1

5

545

11.85248

9.757364

0

42

539

2.391466

1.082473

1

4

537

1.77095

1.069268

1

4

498

3.608434

1.14769

1

5

545

1.880734

.3243991

1

2

582
582
498

.7817869
.5171821
3.807229

.4133881
.5001345
1.199844

0
0
1

1
1
5

to outcome

Collateral
Consequences,
importance to
outcome

Client Custody
Status, importance
to outcome

Client Criminal
History,
importance to
outcome

Years of
Experience as
Defense Attorney
Number of Jury
Trials Litigated
Number of Bench
Trials Litigated
Reputation of
Defender as Trial
Attorney,
importance to
outcome

Prior Experience
of Defender as
Prosecutor

White
Male
Prosecutor Office
Policy, importance
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499

3.781563

1.132923

1

5

493

3.079108

1.185888

1

5

497

3.889336

1.059627

1

5

500

3.868262

1.136526

1

5

498

4.431727

.9829315

1

5

480

4.327083

.8855697

1

5

481

4.343035

.8396417

2

5

481

4.760915

.5273858

2

5

495

3.878788

1.170424

1

5

478

3.985356

.888899

1

5

outcome

Prosecutor
Caseload,
importance to
outcome

Prediction of Trial
Outcome,
importance to
negotiation
outcome
Prediction of
Sentence,
importance to
negotiation
outcome
Client's Wants
and Needs,
importance to
negotiation
outcome
Prediction of Trial
Outcome,
importance to
preparation
Prediction of
Sentence,
importance to
preparation
Clear Sense of
Client's Goals,
importance to
preparation
Knowledge of
Alternatives to
Incarceration,

importance to
preparation
Frequency of
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Collateral
Consequences
Frequency of
Signaling vigorous
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488

3.381148

.8658553

1

5

490

2.257143

.9084921

1

5

493

3.233266

.7519277

1

5

493

3.210953

.9690965

1

5

Motions Practice

Frequency of
Bluffing Aabout
Potential Defenses

Frequency of
Sharing
Information with
Prosecutor
Frequency of
Prosecutor
Initiating
Negotiation
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